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 REFORMING INSTITUTIONS: THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN 
BANKRUPTCY AND PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 
KATHLEEN G. NOONAN, JONATHAN C. LIPSON & WILLIAM H. SIMON 
Public law litigation (PLL) is among the most important and controversial types of 
dispute that courts face. These civil class actions seek to reform public agencies such 
as police departments, prison systems, and child welfare agencies that have failed to 
meet basic statutory or constitutional obligations. They are controversial because 
critics assume that judicial intervention is categorically undemocratic or beyond 
judicial expertise. 
This Article reveals flaws in these criticisms by comparing the judicial function 
in PLL to that in corporate bankruptcy, where the value and legitimacy of judicial 
intervention are better understood and more accepted. Our comparison shows that 
judicial intervention in both spheres responds to coordination problems that make 
individual stakeholder action ineffective, and it explains how courts in both spheres 
can require and channel major organizational change without administering the 
organizations themselves or inefficiently constricting the discretion of managers. 
The comparison takes on greater urgency in light of the Trump administration’s vow 
to “deconstruct the administrative state,” a promise which, if kept, will likely 
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INTRODUCTION 
Large organizations sometimes fail, and when they do, courts may be asked to 
provide a remedy. Often, the remedy is restructuring. Perhaps the largest categories 
of judicial restructuring are bankruptcy reorganization and “public law litigation” 
(PLL)—civil rights or regulatory cases seeking structural relief against a government 
agency. Both types of intervention occur frequently, and contrary to some claims, 
there is no evidence that either is in terminal decline.1 
Bankruptcy and PLL address similar problems in similar ways, but PLL has 
proved vastly more controversial. No one doubts that bankruptcy courts have the 
authority to facilitate massive change in troubled corporations. While there are 
debates at the margins about how best to achieve bankruptcy’s goals, most 
commentators concede the effectiveness of such intervention in a substantial range 
of cases.2 
There is, however, much more controversy about both the legitimacy and the 
efficacy of judicial efforts in PLL to reform prisons, schools, police departments, and 
other public agencies. Critics assert that judicial efforts to restructure public 
institutions are categorically undemocratic, or ineffective, or both.3  
Yet, the rationales for, and the techniques of, intervention are similar in both 
spheres.4 Although the details of practice vary, the most characteristic form of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See infra notes 35–46 and accompanying text.  
 2. See infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra Part III; e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 
(1977); ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS 
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 10–12 (2003); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the 
Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 
1121 (1996). 
 4. In his seminal article defining and christening “public law litigation,” Abram Chayes 
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bankruptcy reorganization resembles an increasingly common form of intervention 
in public law litigation. Specifically, we compare the Chapter 11 “bootstrap” 
reorganization in which the bankruptcy court supervises the restructuring of an 
organization that is expected to continue operation as a freestanding entity, with the 
PLL “framework” decree in which the district court induces fairly comprehensive 
reform but focuses largely on governance and accountability structures rather than 
mandates specific practices.  
In both types of case, judicial intervention is triggered by the organization’s 
demonstrated failure to satisfy large-scale legal obligations. Both types of relief 
respond to collective action problems that make individual claim adjudication 
impossible or inefficient. The courts help parties develop remedial frameworks that 
are decentralized, experimental, and provisional in order to limit and channel 
incumbent managers’ control over the organization for the benefit of stakeholders 
whose legal interests have been jeopardized by its operations. In various ways, courts 
force or persuade managers to account to and engage with the organizations’ 
stakeholders in order to comply with baseline obligations. 
Critics mistakenly assume that PLL courts actually “run” the agencies they help 
to restructure. But this is no more the case in PLL than in bankruptcy. Rather, 
bankruptcy courts in Chapter 11 cases and district courts in PLL cases typically issue 
decrees that focus on broad issues of governance and accountability reflected in 
frameworks negotiated by the parties. Like bankruptcy judges, district judges in PLL 
do not directly impose practices derived from doctrine or technical expertise. In 
principle, courts withdraw when the debtor or defendant has given credible assurance 
that its reconfigured operations will respect the interests of the complaining 
stakeholders. While PLL and corporate bankruptcy obviously differ in their details, 
courts and participants in these processes address them in substantially similar ways. 
Our comparison seeks to quiet anxieties about public law litigation and to enhance 
explanations about how it works. By analogizing PLL to a less controversial area of 
practice, we emphasize that judicially facilitated restructuring is less extraordinary 
than critics tend to assume. At the same time, the analogy helps develop 
generalizations about how this kind of judicial intervention works, and how it can be 
further improved. 
Our analysis is also motivated by a sense of urgency. The Trump administration 
has vowed to “deconstruct . . . the administrative state,”5 which implies, among other 
                                                                                                                 
 
pointed out the analogy to bankruptcy, noting that “[f]rom 1870 to 1933, federal judges . . . 
reorganized over 1,000 railroads.” Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1303 n.92 (1976). He didn’t develop the analogy, however. 
Id. Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen Yeazell, and later, Susan Sturm, seconded Chayes’s 
observation, but they did not develop it either. Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The 
Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 485–86 
(1980); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 
1384, 1445 (1991). 
 5. Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for ‘Deconstruction of the 
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things, a reduction in the level and quality of services administered by public 
agencies. A new wave of institutional reform litigation may be one response, whether 
to enforce existing decrees, or to address new grievances, or both. In the near term, 
courts may face new and greater PLL challenges than they have in many years. 
Part I gives a brief overview of the two spheres of reorganizational practice. Part 
II reveals important similarities in these facially different areas of practice. Part III 
uses the comparison to bankruptcy to challenge major complaints about PLL, to 
establish affirmative grounds for judicially supervised restructuring in both spheres, 
and to offer suggestions about further adaptation in PLL practice by analogy to 
bankruptcy. 
I. TWO SPHERES OF COURT-SUPERVISED REORGANIZATION 
A. Chapter 11 Reorganizations 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the principal legal mechanism for 
restructuring troubled but viable business organizations.6 It prescribes a judicial 
process overseen by specialized, congressionally created (Article I) courts that are 
“units” of, and supervised by, United States district (Article III) courts.7  
Restructuring in this context has no single template but typically involves the 
refinancing and discharge of debt, sale of certain lines of business, entity 
reconfiguration, and changes in management and personnel and firm governance.8 
Although there are many variations, we focus chiefly on the traditional “bootstrap” 
reorganization where incumbents manage the debtor with the goal of gaining 
stakeholder support for a reorganization plan whereby the company will remain a 
going concern after bankruptcy.9 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. “Chapter 11” generally refers to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2012), as well as other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and Judicial Code. The current version of the Bankruptcy 
Code was originally enacted in 1978, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 
92 Stat. 2549 (1978), and has been amended several times, most recently in 2005, Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 11, 18, and 28 of the U.S. 
Code). 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012). 
 8. As LoPucki and Doherty explain, companies in Chapter 11: 
may undergo tumultuous changes during bankruptcy. They may shrink in size, 
be split into multiple businesses, sell their businesses to new owners, discharge 
their managers, change their names, and fundamentally change the nature of their 
businesses. One or more businesses may survive after a bankruptcy, but it may 
nevertheless be difficult to say whether that survivor is the bankrupt company, a 
company that acquired the bankrupt company, or a company that acquired 
elements of the bankrupt company. 
Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Survival, 62 UCLA L. REV. 970, 979 
(2015). 
 9. There is some concern among practitioners and observers that bootstrap 
reorganizations are passé, and that Chapter 11 is now chiefly used to sell companies. Baird 
and Rasmussen dramatically opened a 2002 paper: “Corporate reorganizations have all but 
disappeared.” Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. 
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Some of the nation’s largest and most economically important companies have 
reorganized under Chapter 11, including General Motors10 and Chrysler,11 every 
legacy commercial airline (e.g., American,12 United,13 Delta14), most companies with 
exposure to asbestos liability (e.g., Johns-Manville,15 W.R. Grace16), as well as many 
“big-box” retailers (e.g., RadioShack17), industrial firms (e.g., Lyondell Chemical18), 
and fossil fuel-related businesses (e.g., Energy Future Holdings19). For the year 
ended June 30, 2017, about 5900 companies filed for Chapter 11 relief. 20 Since 1995, 
over 1000 very large companies—those with more than $100 million in assets and 
publicly-traded securities—have reorganized in this way.21 
Wealth maximization is the principal normative justification and metric in such 
cases. “Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if 
                                                                                                                 
 
REV. 751, 751 (2002). Brubaker and Tabb have a more temperate view: “[T]here actually is 
no clean, clear distinction between reorganization by ‘plan’ and reorganization by ‘sale’ 
—through the wonders of sophisticated transaction engineering, each can be the precise 
functional equivalent of the other.” Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 
1375. Whether the company is sold or remains independent, the court’s intervention involves 
oversight of the construction of a new organizational framework. Jay Westbrook has more 
recently observed that sales are common, but perhaps not as common as some may think. Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook, Secured Creditor Control and Bankruptcy Sales: An Empirical View, 
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 831, 835 (reporting empirical study of sales for the benefit of secured 
creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy). 
 10. See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), enforcement 
denied by sub nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 11. See In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 12. See Supplement B Pilot Beneficiaries v. AMR Corp. & Am. Airlines Inc. (In re AMR 
Corp.), 523 B.R. 415 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 13. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n (In re UAL Corp.), 346 
B.R. 456 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 14. See Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 05-17923 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
http://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/delta1-122006.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZW6 
-ZRFF]. 
 15. See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 638 
(2d Cir. 1988). 
 16. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 446 B.R. 96 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
 17. See Salus Capital Partners LLC v. Standard Wireless, Inc. (In re RadioShack Corp.), 
550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
 18. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Services, Inc. (In re Lyondell 
Chem. Co.), 402 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 19. See CSC Trust Co. of Del. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holdings Co. (In re Energy 
Future Holdings Corp.), 513 B.R. 651 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014). 
 20. UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE F-2 (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default 
/files/data_tables/bf_f2_0630.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ5K-6LWK].  
 21. This figure is based on a one-variable study in the UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy 
Research Database, selecting for “trend in filings” for years 1995–2018. A Window on the 
World of Big-Case Bankruptcy, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKRUPTCY RES. DATABASE, http:// 
lopucki.law.ucla.edu/design_a_study.asp?ShowStudies=Flexible [https://perma.cc/58YN 
-73NX] (adjusting to 1980-dollar valuations).  
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used in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap’” in a liquidation, the Supreme 
Court has stated.22 Few observers challenge this presumption, or the judicially-
centered approach Congress has selected.23 This may be because in broad terms it is 
viewed as largely successful. One recent study found that seventy percent of large-
company reorganizations succeeded in the sense that these companies remained 
going concerns, either independently or as identifiable parts of other companies.24 
Critics have occasionally proposed that the courts’ role in business reorganization 
be transferred to an agency. They argue that the administrative characteristics of 
bankruptcy would be more appropriate for the executive branch.25 Indeed, when 
banks and insurance companies fail, they are not permitted to use bankruptcy.26 
While it is true that bankruptcy is the only major congressional power to be 
implemented almost entirely through courts,27 many find that the greater 
transparency and political independence of the courts offer substantial advantages. 
Restructuring under Chapter 11 creates opportunities and incentives for stakeholder 
participation unavailable in other contexts. 
Judicially-supervised corporate restructuring is not limited to bankruptcy courts. 
Several states have receivership and analogous statutes that permit the restructuring 
of some organizations within that state.28 When debtors such as banks or insurance 
companies cannot use bankruptcy, or when a debtor’s assets and creditors are 
concentrated in a single state, such proceedings may be used instead of bankruptcy. 
While this may be rare, state courts acting in this capacity function much like a 
federal bankruptcy court in Chapter 11. In the Ambac case,29 for example, a state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983). 
 23. This has not always been the case. Some early critics argued that the system was 
inherently inefficient and should be abandoned. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The 
Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1050–52 (1992). More recent studies 
suggest that the system operates in a reasonably efficient manner. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 603, 606 (2009). 
 24. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 8, at 972. Success in reorganization (understood as a 
confirmed plan) appears to be a function, in part, of size. See Jonathan C. Lipson & Christopher 
Fiore Marotta, Examining Success, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 37 (2016) (finding in sample of 
about 1200 cases that ninety percent of cases involving over $100 million in assets confirmed 
plans while only half of smaller cases did so). 
 25. The Brookings Study proposed administrative resolution for consumer bankruptcies. 
DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BROOKINGS INST., BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, 
REFORM 196–218 (1971). Title II of the Dodd-Frank reforms would have much this effect for 
the “orderly liquidation” of “systemically important financial institutions.” Jonathan C. 
Lipson, Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis of Financial Crises, 17 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 673, 679 (2015) (citing Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010)). 
 26. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012). 
 27. Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of 
Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 644 (2008). 
 28. See Paul A. Lucey, The Liquidating “Chapter 11” in State Court, 20 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Feb. 2001, at 12, 12. 
 29. See In re Rehab. of Ambac Assur. Corp., No. 10 CV 1576, 2013 WL 3466812, at *1 
(W.D. Wis. July 10, 2013) (“The rehabilitation proceedings for Ambac Assurance Corporation 
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court in Wisconsin supervised the restructuring of an insurance company subsidiary 
and coordinated its efforts with the bankruptcy court in New York, which supervised 
the Chapter 11 case of the parent holding company.30 
B. Public Law Litigation 
Structural injunctions address a broad range of the operations of government 
agency defendants. These decrees are most strongly identified with civil rights 
claims, but they can be found in other areas.31 Public law litigation is most closely 
identified with the federal courts, but a substantial number of structural decrees have 
emerged from state courts, including some of the most ambitious.32 Since the mid-
1990s, when the Supreme Court reversed two structural decrees as abuses of 
remedial discretion, PLL has sometimes been described as moribund,33 but as with 
similar assertions in bankruptcy, such claims are exaggerated.34  
                                                                                                                 
 
were initiated in early 2010 in the Circuit Court for Dane County, the designated state 
rehabilitation court.”).  
 30. See Michael J. de la Merced, Ambac Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Nov. 8, 2010, 7:13 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/ambac-files-for 
-bankruptcy/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9XU9-KXAA]. 
 31. They have occurred in many complex environmental controversies. E.g., CHARLES M. 
HAAR, MASTERING BOSTON HARBOR: COURTS, DOLPHINS, AND IMPERILED WATERS (2005) 
(describing the court-induced cleanup of Boston Harbor). They also have a long lineage in 
antitrust law. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE: WHY LESS IS MORE (2007). And they have some resemblance to recent practice in 
which corporations agree to submit to monitoring and adopt compliance procedures in return 
for deferral of prosecution for violation of, for example, the securities laws or the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS 
COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014). 
 32. E.g., Perez v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. 1980) (approving decree 
reforming the Boston Housing Authority); HAAR, supra note 31 (chronicling the judicially 
supervised cleanup of Boston harbor); CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, 
SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996) (chronicling the decades-long judicial efforts to induce 
reform of exclusionary zoning practices in New Jersey). 
 33. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1195 (2009) (characterizing the structural injunction as “a dying 
breed”); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE  L. J. 1836, 1860–
61 (2015) (doubting the “broad availability of systemic challenges”). The two famous cases 
reversing systemic relief are Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), a school desegregation 
case, and Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), a prison case. 
 34. Since the reversal in Casey, the Court has upheld extensive structural relief in the 
prison context. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (upholding order likely to require 
release of thousands of prisoners). Since its reversal in Jenkins, it has upheld claims in the 
education context that foreseeably required a complex remedial response. See United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) [hereinafter VMI] (holding unconstitutional gender 
discrimination at Virginia Military Academy); Katharine T. Bartlett, Unconstitutionally 
Male?: The Story of United States v. Virginia, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES 133, 166–77 
(Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011) (describing implementation of 
the VMI ruling). In their critique of structural injunctions, Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod 
noted a widespread belief that the practice is “over and done with” but rejected the belief as 
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The area where the claim of decline has been most thoroughly studied is 
incarceration. This is the sector in which there has been the strongest pushback 
against systemic relief, both from appellate decisions heightening proof burdens and 
a federal statute designed to restrict remedial discretion. Margo Schlanger reports 
that, while the number of orders has declined and their scope has narrowed in recent 
decades, structural intervention still plays a prominent role in prison reform.35 In 
2011, the Supreme Court affirmed a population cap order effectively requiring the 
release of tens of thousands of prisoners in California.36 In 2006, the latest date for 
which data is available, about a third of the prisoners in California’s local jails and 
eleven percent of the nationwide jail population were in facilities covered by 
framework decrees governing inmate populations.37 
The story is similar in other areas: a decline in number and narrowing in scope of 
structural orders, but still a substantial number of pending cases and active decrees 
that are a major influence in many jurisdictions on schools,38 mental health 
institutions,39 police departments,40 child protection agencies,41 and environmental 
regulation and management agencies.42 For example, a 2006 survey of child 
protective services litigation reports that in the preceding ten years, class actions 
against child welfare agencies had been initiated in thirty-two states and consent 
decrees or settlement agreements were in effect in thirty of those states.43 Or to take 
another example, since 1994, when Congress authorized the Department of Justice 
to seek systemic relief for police misconduct, the Department has achieved broad 
consent decrees or settlement agreements with the police agencies of more than 
                                                                                                                 
 
mistaken. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 10. Other scholars noting the continued 
vitality of PLL include Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops 
. . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143 (2003); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004); 
and Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued Vitality of Prophylactic Relief, 27 REV. LITIG. 99 (2007). 
 35. Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison 
Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 576–82, 602–05 (2006). 
 36. Plata, 563 U.S. 493. 
 37. Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and 
Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 197–98 (2013). 
 38. See, e.g., David Rostetter & Katrina Arndt, Class Action Lawsuits and Consent 
Decrees in Special Education: Recommendations for Practice, 23 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 
195 (2012); Lauren Nicole Gillespie, Note, The Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation: 
Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (2010). 
 39. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization 
Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 40. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 48–49 (2d ed. 2014); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of 
Responsible Administration and the Problem of Police Accountability, 33 YALE J. REG. 165 
(2016). 
 41. See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, CHILD WELFARE CONSENT DECREES: 
ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE COURT ACTIONS FROM 1995 TO 2005 (Oct. 2005). 
 42. See, e.g., HAAR, supra note 31; Nathan Matthews, Note, Rewatering the San Joaquin 
River: A Summary of the Friant Dam Litigation, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1109 (2007).  
 43. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, supra note 41, at 2. 
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twenty cities, including some of the biggest in the country.44 New York City recently 
operated under twenty-nine settlement agreements or decrees mandating broad 
administrative relief.45 
To be sure, there have been changes over the years in the form judicial 
intervention takes. As we show below, some of these changes respond to critiques of 
structural decrees; yet critical discussion has not always acknowledged these 
changes. Those whose knowledge of the legal system derives from appellate opinions 
are likely to be underinformed, since appellate discussion is often out of touch with 
lower court practice. The misapprehension is due in part to the fact that many cases 
settle and are not appealed (consent decrees can sometimes be challenged on appeal 
where interveners object or a defendant seeks modification, but such appeals are 
rare). Misapprehension also arises from the fact that practice has evolved in ways 
that make some of the concerns expressed in appellate cases irrelevant, as we 
elaborate below.46  
II. COMPARING BANKRUPTCY AND PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 
This part compares and contrasts key features of judicially supervised 
reorganization in bankruptcy and public law litigation, including the rationale for 
structural intervention, the required prima facie showing, stakeholder representation, 
formulation and implementation of the remedy, and termination of the court’s 
involvement. In all of these matters, there are important analogies between the work 
of bankruptcy courts and that of PLL courts. 
A. The Rationale for Structural Intervention 
Intervention in both spheres is a response to coordination problems presented by 
multiple individual claim assertions and, in addition, by the need to protect 
vulnerable stakeholders who would not be able to assert claims effectively as 
individuals.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 40, at 48–51. 
 45. E-mail from Thomas Crane, Chief, Gen. Litig. Div., N.Y.C. Law Dep’t, to William 
H. Simon, Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Colum. Law School (July 14, 2015, 1:34 PM) (on 
file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 46. A 2011 Supreme Court case involving a private damage action against Wal-Mart 
appears to have prompted courts to take a stricter view of class certification in public law 
litigation. David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777 (2016) 
(documenting and criticizing this development). The recent cases require a more extensive 
preliminary showing than in the past. Nevertheless, most well-prepared and adequately funded 
public law claims should be able to satisfy the requirement. There are several examples of 
recently certified public law claims. See, e.g., Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(challenging prison health care); Unknown Parties v. Johnson, 163 F. Supp. 3d 630 (D. Ariz. 
2016) (challenging jail conditions); Fish v. Kobach, 318 F.R.D. 450 (D. Kan. 2016) 
(challenging voting restrictions); DL v. District of Columbia, 312 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(challenging administration of special education); Gray v. County of Riverside, No. EDCV 
13–00444–VAP (OPx), 2014 WL 5304915 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) (challenging jail 
conditions). 
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1. Bankruptcy 
The basic premise of corporate reorganization under Chapter 11 is that the debtor 
is or soon will be unable to fulfill its legal obligations on a large scale.47 The debtor’s 
obligations may arise under contracts (as with bonds or loan agreements), in tort (as 
with such famous examples as asbestosis and mesothelioma), or otherwise (e.g., tax 
obligations).48 In the absence of bankruptcy, debts can be collected only on an 
individual basis, usually in a state court of general jurisdiction.49 Large corporate 
debtors may have hundreds or thousands of creditors50 and may have defaulted as to 
many of them. Applicable state law is likely to follow the “race of diligence” model, 
meaning that the first creditor to obtain a judgment and execute on it will have first 
priority in the debtor’s unencumbered assets.51 This will generally be true regardless 
of the size or source of the creditor’s claim. Collection is characterized as a race 
because it is largely a function of speed through the judicial system.52 For a debtor 
with many creditors, it is likely to be highly inefficient and distributively arbitrary. 
Inefficiencies stem largely from coordination failures and information 
asymmetries. Absent bankruptcy, claims of unsecured creditors must be prosecuted 
through a complaint and, assuming no defense, a default judgment which is then used 
as the basis for seizing property, usually through the ministrations of a sheriff or 
receiver in the jurisdiction in which the creditor may find the debtor’s property.53 
Any given creditor is unlikely to know the position of all (or even many) other 
creditors in the race of diligence, and thus their respective relative priority in the 
debtor’s assets. Even if they were to obtain this information, it would be difficult to 
know whether the debtor’s assets were sufficient to satisfy all claims or, more 
plausibly, which claims, since the debtor’s assets almost certainly would be 
insufficient to pay all creditors in full.54 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
 48. See supra notes 10–19. 
 49. See Richard F. Broude, The Automatic Stay, C867 ALI-ABA 379, 383 (1993). 
 50. See, e.g., In re RS Legacy Corp., 62 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 94 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (29,798 
claims according to RS Legacy Corporation fka RadioShack Corporation (15-10197), PRIME 
CLERK, https://cases.primeclerk.com/radioshack/Home-ClaimInfo [https://perma.cc/Z5MG 
-E5E2]); In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., 561 B.R. 441 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015) (20,040 
claims according to Prime Clerk, Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, Inc. (15-
01145), PRIME CLERK, https://cases.primeclerk.com/ceoc/Home-ClaimInfo [https://perma.cc 
/EV5H-USYA]); In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 513 B.R. 651 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014) 
(over 66,000 claims according to Energy Future Holdings Corp., et al., EPIQ CASES, 
https://dm.epiq11.com/#/case/efh/claims [https://perma.cc/9EHV-N2XL]). The number of 
claims is likely greater than the number of creditors, as creditors may file multiple or 
duplicative claims. 
 51. We discuss the rights of secured creditors below and put to one side the effect that 
statutory liens may have for select creditors (e.g., mechanics’ liens). 
 52. See A. Ari Afilalo, Case Comment, The Impact of Union Bank v. Wolas on the 
Ordinary Course of Business Defense to a Trustee’s Avoiding Powers, 72 B.U. L. REV. 625, 
626–27 (1992). 
 53. See, e.g., PA. R. CIV. P. 3023, 3104 (2002 & Supp. 2018) (regarding judgment liens 
and execution). 
 54. Creditors could form groups and pursue their claims collectively. But in cases with 
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Some creditors may succeed, however, and they would have the power to force a 
sale of the debtor’s assets to satisfy their claims and the attendant administrative 
costs.55 Because sheriffs and receivers cannot generally seize or sell property outside 
of their jurisdictions, creditors of a multijurisdictional debtor (which would be most 
large corporations) face significant coordination problems. The historic example is 
the railroad: if “the lines of the road [were] broken up and fragments thereof placed 
in the hands of various receivers, and the rolling stock, materials, and supplies seized 
and scattered abroad, the result would be irreparable injury to all persons having any 
interest in said line of road.”56 
In many cases, it is unlikely that creditors could avoid the inefficiencies of 
individual collection actions by organizing and renegotiating their relationships 
without direct or indirect judicial assistance. Most large debtors will have complex 
capital structures which produce webs of interrelated debts. A single debtor may be 
composed of many subsidiaries and affiliates, each of which may have separate or 
shared financial creditors (e.g., banks and bondholders).57 In many cases, some but 
not all debtors in a corporate group will also have obligations to general unsecured 
trade creditors, taxing authorities, and perhaps tort claimants or terminated 
employees seeking recovery.58 Bankruptcy exists because it is often difficult for such 
heterogeneous claimants to coordinate when the debtor encounters financial 
distress.59 
                                                                                                                 
 
widely dispersed creditors, such as trade creditors, or creditors whose claims may be 
contingent and unliquidated, such as tort creditors, coordination is likely to be difficult, if not 
impossible. Given the temporal orientation of state collection law, creditors are likely to view 
themselves as competitors for the debtor’s limited assets, not allies. 
 55. See Afilalo, supra note 52, at 628.  
 56. Oscar Lasdon, The Evolution of Railroad Reorganization, 88 BANKING L.J. 3, 7 
(1971). Lasdon was discussing the 1884 federal equity receivership of the Wabash, St. Louis 
& Pacific Railway (“Wabash”) where receivers were appointed due to the impending default 
of one of more than thirty mortgages it had granted. Id. at 6–9. Wabash was the first American 
railway system to do this in federal court on its own initiative. See DAVID A. SKEEL JR., DEBT’S 
DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 63–64 (2001) (discussing precedent-
setting nature of the Wabash receivership). 
 57. General Growth Properties, the largest real-estate-based Chapter 11, had 160 special-
purpose subsidiaries. In re General Growth Props. Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); 
Petition of General Growth Properties, Inc. at 23–26. 
 58. Even debtors that fully encumber their assets prepetition will have unsecured creditors 
who hope that the debtor’s estate may find some unencumbered assets, somehow. For 
example, property a debtor acquires after commencement of the case is unlikely to be 
encumbered by a prebankruptcy lien, even if the security agreement had a so-called “after-
acquired property” clause purporting to encumber such property. Bankruptcy Code § 552 
specifically disables such provisions. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012). Thus, revenue earned during 
the case could be unencumbered and may be available to general unsecured creditors under a 
reorganization plan, free from a prebankruptcy lien. 
 59. To be sure, there have been interesting proposals to promote ex ante coordination, 
e.g., through charter or other contractual mechanisms that might effectively cash out all 
creditors upon general default. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of 
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 323, 332–33 (1993) (proposing that 
debt be treated as “chameleon equity” on default). While these models “may have been 
elegant, their particular proposals seem not to have appealed to the institution contractualists 
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Market coordination can occur through the renegotiation of major defaulted debt 
contracts. Although these negotiations often work, they are sometimes precluded by 
the number and diversity of creditor interests.60 This has led to a dynamic in which 
some creditors may be tempted to hold out for a better deal.61 Bankruptcy addresses 
these coordination failures directly through the automatic stay, if a case is 
commenced.62 Even if a case is not commenced, the threat of bankruptcy is a major 
factor in bringing recalcitrant parties to the table. Thus, actual or potential bankruptcy 
is a major factor in coordinating otherwise dispersed and potentially adverse 
creditors. 
The market is also unlikely to correct distributive imbalances in the restructuring 
process. Such imbalances may arise because some stakeholders are more 
sophisticated and better resourced than others. The well-endowed can exploit 
collective action failures to gain relatively greater recovery shares. Professionalized 
distress investors, sometimes known as “vulture funds,” can in some cases 
manipulate the process to increase their own recoveries at the expense of less 
sophisticated stakeholders, such as unrepresented employees.63  
Small public shareholders and employees have been thought especially vulnerable 
to disproportionate loss of the debtor’s going concern value in a liquidation for the 
benefit of the senior creditors. Shareholders are protected by the possibilities of a 
representative committee and a vote on a reorganization plan, if the debtor is 
plausibly solvent.64 Deeming the interests of employees of “special social 
importance,” Congress has given them enhanced protection.65 It is, for example, 
harder for the debtor to escape collective bargaining agreements than other 
contracts.66 Wage claims have priority above most other unsecured debts.67 Debtors 
may pay in full and immediately (i.e., during the case) prebankruptcy wage claims 
                                                                                                                 
 
extolled—the market, where they remain largely unused.” Jonathan C. Lipson, Bargaining 
Bankrupt: A Relational Theory of Contract in Bankruptcy, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 239, 266 
(2016). 
 60. Although there have been recent developments on this front, courts historically 
viewed the Trust Indenture Act as requiring strict unanimity among bondholders in 
prebankruptcy workouts. See Marblegate Asset Mgmt. v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 846 F.3d 1 (2d 
Cir. 2017), vacating and remanding, 111 F. Supp. 3d 542, 556–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing 
Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 (1987)). 
 61. The dynamic is exacerbated by provisions of the Trust Indenture Act that prohibit 
material changes to a bond indenture absent unanimous consent of bondholders, which is 
usually difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. See Roe, supra note 60. 
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
 63. Lipson & Marotta, supra note 24, at 17–18. 
 64. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(2), 1104 (2012); see also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. 
Whitford, Bargaining over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, 
Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 195–96 (1990). 
 65. S. REP. NO. 95-1106, at 4 (1978). 
 66. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012).  
 67. Id. § 507(a)(4); see also Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986 (2017) 
(“Congress established employee wage priority ‘to alleviate in some degree the hardship that 
unemployment usually brings to workers and their families’ when an employer files for 
bankruptcy.”) (quoting United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 32 (1959)). 
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that might otherwise be paid fractionally at the end of the case, as well as outstanding 
claims of so-called “critical vendors.”68 
2. Public Law Litigation  
As in bankruptcy, the basic premise of structural relief in public law litigation is 
that the defendant on its current course is or soon will be unable to fulfill its legal 
obligations, and individual relief would be inefficient, distributively arbitrary, or 
unresponsive to some aspects of the claim. In each of these situations, individual 
relief is “inadequate” in the sense of traditional equity jurisprudence, though the 
rights at stake often arise from modern welfare and regulatory programs rather than 
the common law rights around which traditional doctrine developed. 
Inadequacy can arise in at least three forms. The second and third are analogous 
to rationales for bankruptcy. 
First, the plaintiffs’ claim may directly implicate a collective good or practice that 
cannot be altered on an individual basis. Many discrimination claims have this 
quality. Meaningfully equal treatment of a minority person in a public institution 
may require more than changing the institution’s conduct toward her individually. It 
may require the reconfiguration of general practices that marginalize the plaintiff by 
excluding others like her or by broadly communicating derogatory messages.69 Many 
environmental claims have an analogous quality. The substantive right is defined 
largely as a right to enjoy a natural environment in a condition untainted by improper 
practices. Since the good here is indivisible, specific enforcement would not be 
possible on an individualized basis. In both the desegregation and environmental 
cases, individual monetary relief would be possible but would have two 
disadvantages. It would be incommensurate with any nonmaterial dimension of the 
claim. And it would be hard to calculate even the material damage numerically. 
A second reason why legal remedies may be inadequate is that, to the extent that 
individual harms are foreseeable and preventable, it may be more efficient and more 
just to intervene preventively than to compensate post hoc. Even if we assume that 
prison violations of the Eighth Amendment can be fairly compensated monetarily, it 
might be less costly to do so with systemic relief.70 If, for example, a court can 
reliably determine that a prison system that delegates power to favored inmates 
(“trusties”) to discipline their fellow prisoners will cause many more violations than 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 69. Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–24 (1979) 
(noting that the focus of desegregation suits tends to be, not an “incident of wrongdoing” but 
a “social condition”). The systemic dimension of nondiscrimination is especially clear with 
respect to jury discrimination. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). No 
particular person has a right to sit on a jury, and no defendant has a right to have minority 
individuals on his jury. The relevant entitlement is the right to a jury selected in a 
nondiscriminatory manner. Only systemic relief can vindicate the right. 
 70. E.g., United States v. Ciampitti, 615 F. Supp. 116 (D.N.J. 1984), aff’d mem., 772 F.2d 
893 (3d Cir. 1985) (ordering defendant to undertake restoration of waterway polluted by 
discharges in violation of the Clean Water Act). 
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an alternative system that serves the defendant’s legitimate purposes as well, the 
most efficient remedy may be to enjoin the trustie regime.71 
Note that the efficiency calculation in PLL has to consider not only the procedural 
costs of the individual claims that are likely to be brought but the costs of injuries 
that, in the absence of systemic relief, will never give rise to claims because the 
victims lack the information, resources, or security to bring the claims. In prisons, 
for example, it seems likely that only a fraction of meritorious claims come to the 
attention of the courts because prisoners lack the ability to identify them, or the 
ability to advance them, or plausibly fear retaliation by prison personnel. At the same 
time, many nonmeritorious individual claims are filed in court by prisoners, usually 
in propria persona. Prison officials seem content with this system of individual relief 
because it rarely results in orders that interfere with their discretion.72 But they might 
feel differently if prisoners were able to effectively assert all the valid individual 
claims that arise. Under those circumstances, they might prefer structural relief to a 
long series of varying and potentially inconsistent individual orders. Here, PLL 
resembles bankruptcy’s effort to protect employees and small general creditors. The 
goal is not only to avoid the inefficiencies of individual claim assertion but also to 
mitigate vulnerabilities that would prevent some stakeholders from asserting claims 
at all. 
Third, individual relief against public agencies can be distributively arbitrary in 
various respects. To begin, it is at least theoretically possible that, if all claimants 
with valid claims were able to obtain individual money judgments, the defendant’s 
resources could be exhausted before all claims were paid. This virtually never 
happens, however. On the other hand, it is not unusual for resources to be diverted 
away from activities that are not subject to claim pressure in order to satisfy 
individual claims. It is expensive for school districts to adjudicate and fund relief for 
special education claims, and it is often asserted that this result reduces resources, 
and consequently, quality, for regular education programs. If the special education 
students have stronger claims to these resources than the other students, this result 
might be justifiable. But general education students have various rights as well that 
might be jeopardized by a reduction in resources.73 Like the race of diligence that 
creditors run before bankruptcy, individualized relief in PLL could produce results 
harmful to those least able to assert their claims. 
The same limitations can arise with class relief that takes the form of very specific 
directives. An injunction mandating compliance with deadlines for processing 
applications may result in greater delay in responding to requests from those who are 
already receiving benefits. Such distributive issues cannot be readily considered in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. See David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and 
Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1057–62 (2004) (describing trend in prison cases 
to prohibit inmate disciplinarians). 
 72. See Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (in 
Hospitals, a Large Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), J. TORT L., 2008, at 44–50 (“[I]t is rare in 
corrections that . . . information [from individual claims] is used to strategize harm 
reduction.”). 
 73. See MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1997); SANDLER & 
SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 91–92. 
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the context of individual claims. They are more plausibly considered in structural 
decrees that more generally address the sources and uses of those resources. 
The problem of collateral effects, or “polycentricity,” is often said to be an 
objection to structural relief.74 But individual relief does not avoid the problem of 
polycentricity. Not only do individual monetary claims potentially draw resources 
from other activities, but individual injunctive relief creates the possibility of 
arbitrarily differentiated norms. Bespoke orders might reflect widely varying 
understandings across different courts or judges. In general, the broader the decree, 
the more it can potentially address collateral effects. Thus, polycentricity is not 
considered a problem in bankruptcy because the decree there—the plan of 
reorganization—is all-encompassing, addressing all of the debtor’s operations, as 
well as its assets and liabilities. 
As bankruptcy is commonly seen as a response to market failure, public law 
litigation might be seen as a response to political failure. Two broad kinds of political 
failure may produce the kind of systemic noncompliance that calls for structural 
relief. 
The first is that electoral processes may be unfairly hostile or selectively 
indifferent to vulnerable people and groups. Some constitutional rights may be clear 
and yet not attract majoritarian support in the electoral process. Or legislatures may 
find it expedient to enact statutory rights for vulnerable people while neglecting to 
provide adequate enforcement. Or officials may use their discretion to pursue selfish 
and idiosyncratic goals. 
The second form of political failure arises from the fragmentation of executive 
authority. The most common collective action problems in PLL, as in bankruptcy, 
arise among stakeholders, but some PLL cases also present such problems on the 
agency side. Authority to implement statutory mandates is often divided among 
multiple governmental units that may have difficulty coordinating. The Boston 
Harbor cleanup case is an extreme but revealing example.75 There was a good deal 
of political mobilization in support of cleaning up the harbor and very little broad-
based opposition.76 Yet, for decades, this mobilization had failed to induce 
meaningful action.77 The key reason appears to have been the extreme division of 
responsibility among federal, state, local, and regional government entities and 
within each level, among multiple agencies with overlapping subject-matter 
jurisdictions.78 Coordination among all these entities was difficult, and responsibility 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. E.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 55–56. 
 75. See HAAR, supra note 31. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 20–24, 48–63. 
 78. See id. at 64–78. Some political scientists have argued that excessive fragmentation 
of executive authority is a key source of American governmental dysfunction. FRANCES 
FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY 488–505 (2014); Lawrence R. Jacobs & Desmond King, 
The Political Crisis of the American State: The Unsustainable State in a Time of Unraveling, 
in THE UNSUSTAINABLE AMERICAN STATE 3 (Lawrence Jacobs & Desmond King eds., 2009). 
A study of PLL in Colombia focusing on litigation on behalf of internally displaced people 
argues that excessive fragmentation of executive implementation authority is an important 
rationale for judicial intervention. CÉSAR RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO & DIANA RODRÍGUEZ-
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was diffuse. The key intervention of the court was to facilitate and motivate 
coordination among these dispersed actors.79 
Underlying the political dysfunction rationale is the value of the rule of law. This 
value limits the deference that courts can give legislatures and executive officials in 
situations of systemic noncompliance. Legislatures have broad discretion with 
respect to enforcement procedures, and executive officials have broad discretion 
when they operate within such procedures. But even with respect to rights that are 
not constitutionally entailed, the legislature is not free to create rights without 
providing for their enforcement. And executive officials should be accountable for 
their implementation decisions. The limits of this rule-of-law principle are uncertain, 
but no one rejects it categorically, and some version of it appears to underlie 
structural intervention in both PLL80 and in bankruptcy.81 
B. The Prima Facie Case 
The core of the prima facie case in both spheres is a showing that the defendant 
organization as presently constituted is failing to fulfill its legal obligations on a 
widespread basis. 
1. Bankruptcy 
Financial distress is the heart of the prima facie case for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy doctrine and practice sharply distinguish between “voluntary” cases, 
which are “easy” to commence, and “involuntary” cases, which are not. A voluntary 
                                                                                                                 
 
FRANCO, RADICAL DEPRIVATION ON TRIAL: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON 
SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 63–75 (2015). 
 79. See HAAR, supra note 31, at 154–201. 
 80. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that the Constitution 
requires adequate enforcement procedures for some nonconstitutional rights and that adequacy 
depends in part on the importance of the right); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) 
(stating that the United States government “would cease to deserve th[e] high appellation [of 
a government of laws], if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right”). 
But authority has not always been clear or consistent on this point. See RICHARD H. FALLON, 
JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 755–77 (7th ed. 2015) (noting ambiguities in the Supreme Court’s 
commitment to the principle that the Constitution entails that there be practical opportunities 
to enforce rights). Compare Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747 
(1990) (arguing that constitutional due process does not constrain legislative discretion with 
respect to enforcement procedures for welfare rights), with William H. Simon, The Rule of 
Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 777 (1990) (arguing 
that constitutional due process requires reasonably effective procedures to enforce welfare 
rights). Recall that the classic statement of the rule-of-law ideal emphasizes the importance of 
effective enforcement procedures for substantive rules. ALFRED VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION 
TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 107–22 (8th ed. 1915). 
 81. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986 (2017) (forbidding “rare case” 
exceptions to deviations from priority rules on rule-of-law grounds); RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012) (observing that the “Bankruptcy Code 
standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law”). 
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bankruptcy is one that managers of the debtor (in particular, directors) choose to 
commence.82 The Bankruptcy Code does not require a particular level of financial 
distress to commence a voluntary reorganization under Chapter 11, such as technical 
insolvency; it is enough that management believes in good faith that the debtor is, or 
will soon be, unable to pay its debts.83 
The task of establishing the prima facie case for corporate reorganization changes 
when management resists. If corporate managers deny that the debtor is in trouble, 
but creditors believe that a bankruptcy for the debtor would be in their interest, 
creditors may commence an involuntary case.84 The prima facie case for forcing a 
debtor into bankruptcy is a function of both scale and financial condition. A corporate 
debtor with more than eleven creditors cannot be forced into bankruptcy unless at 
least three creditors holding in excess of about $15,000 in unsecured claims join the 
petition.85 Those creditors must be prepared to show that the debtor is “generally not 
paying such debtor’s debts as such debts become due.”86 
Creditors may commence an involuntary bankruptcy because they fear that they 
are about to lose the race of diligence and want to prevent others from levying on the 
debtor’s property.87 They may also worry that the debtor’s management will plunder 
the debtor or simply continue to mismanage it. Yet, an inappropriate bankruptcy can 
seriously disrupt a business by distracting managers, diverting resources, and 
destabilizing relationships with various stakeholders. The vengeful litigant who 
commences an involuntary bankruptcy against an otherwise solvent debtor may 
produce a fait accompli, inducing the very failure the plaintiff purports to worry 
about, destroying an otherwise sound business in the process.88 Involuntary cases 
thus are not, and should not be, “easy” to commence.89 
Whether voluntary or involuntary, the content of the prima facie case is fairly 
straightforward. Payment-related rights, and their violation, are usually easy to 
identify. 
2. Public Law Litigation 
The prima facie case is often more complicated in public law litigation because 
the substantive legal norms and the nature of the organization’s responsibilities are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012). 
 83. Id. § 301. 
 84. Id. § 303. 
 85. Id. § 303(b)(1). 
 86. Id. § 303(h) (providing solvency tests to commence an involuntary case).  
 87. Wade Beavers, Case Comment, Union Bank v. Wolas: Excepting Long-term Debt 
Payments from the Trustee’s Power to Avoid Preferential Transfers, 26 GA. L. REV. 993, 998–
99, 999 n.25 (1992). 
 88. They may also find themselves sanctioned, as the Bankruptcy Code penalizes 
creditors whose involuntary petition fails. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2012); see also In re John 
Richard Homes Bldg. Co., 291 B.R. 727 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (awarding compensatory 
and punitive damages to debtor where creditor commenced improper involuntary case in bad 
faith). 
 89. They have also been fairly rare. See Susan Block-Leib, Why Creditors File So Few 
Involuntary Petitions and Why the Number Is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803 (1991). 
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more contested there than in bankruptcy. We focus on civil rights cases because the 
contrast with bankruptcy is sharpest there. 
Formally, all public law cases are involuntary; there is no technical analogy to the 
voluntary Chapter 11 petition. However, defendant administrators are sometimes 
sympathetic to the plaintiffs, believing that a court’s intervention will produce 
administrative changes, new resources that they cannot generate on their own, or 
judicial supervision that will mitigate coordination problems. Although some critics 
find this seeming conflict troubling,90 it represents an analogy to the voluntary 
Chapter 11 petition. 
With or without sympathetic management, a plaintiff’s prima facie case generally 
involves three elements. 
First, the plaintiff has to show some harmful conduct that violates a legal duty. If 
the duty is specific (say, a statutory prohibition on corporal punishment in schools) 
or the conduct is egregious enough (say, rape by a guard of a prison inmate), its 
illegality will not be controversial. Often, however, there will be a dispute as to 
whether conduct violates some general constitutional standard, such as the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition on “unreasonable” searches and seizures or the due process 
requirement that individuals in state custody receive “appropriate” treatment. In 
elaborating such standards, courts often look to informal social norms connoted by 
terms such as “shocks the conscience” and sometimes to professional standards. In 
these cases, expert testimony is common and usually necessary, especially where 
professional standards are relevant.91 
Second, if the conduct directly causing the harm was performed by frontline 
officials, some additional showing of responsibility is required for relief against 
senior officials or a public entity. Doctrine disclaims respondeat superior in public 
law cases.92 It is not enough, as it usually is with private law claims in bankruptcy, 
that the frontline agent was acting within the scope of his employment. If the 
defendant has explicit policies furthering the unlawful conduct or its senior officials 
have ordered or encouraged it, that will be sufficient. If, however, the conduct or 
conditions that the plaintiffs challenge is not the direct consequence of explicit 
policies or commands, plaintiffs will have to show “deliberate indifference” by 
senior administrators, which means knowledge of the conduct and at least tolerance 
of it.93 For example, excessive force by police officers may contravene a defendant-
agency’s express policies but nevertheless be widespread and accepted by 
management. Similarly, plaintiffs may complain of pollution in a waterway or 
unsanitary conditions in a jail not because managers cause these conditions directly, 
but because managers cannot credibly claim ignorance of them or legitimately fail to 
address them. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. See infra notes 231–238 and accompanying text. 
 91. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (interpreting the right to 
training and freedom from restraints of involuntarily institutionalized mental health patients 
in terms of what “an appropriate professional” would deem “necessary”); Martinez v. Cui, 608 
F.3d 54, 64 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that the “shocks-the-conscience test” governs substantive 
due process challenges to executive conduct). 
 92. Monnell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978). 
 93. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). 
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Third, the plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct is systemic—that is, 
more than a series of idiosyncratic incidents. In bankruptcy, the systemic nature of 
the defendant’s wrong—the likelihood of it defaulting on a large but indeterminate 
range of its obligations—is shown through financial statements. In public law 
litigation, there is no comparable standard form of proof, at least where the conduct 
in question is unauthorized or contrary to articulated policy, such as excessive force 
by police or prison guards.  
The plaintiff usually begins with testimony from members of the plaintiff class of 
episodes of frontline misconduct causing serious harm.94 This will be followed by 
evidence of the failure of the defendant to adopt practices assertedly essential to 
compliance—for example, use-of-force reporting for police, or contracting practices 
enabling timely response to equipment malfunction by housing authorities, or 
training in learning disabilities for special education administrators. Sometimes these 
practices are mandated specifically by statute. More often, they are supported by 
expert opinion about customary norms or by published standards of professional 
organizations. In addition, plaintiffs may present data about aggregate outcomes or 
conditions—for example, racial or gender disparities in arrests, average waiting 
times for processing applications, or sickness or injury rates for prisoners. Testimony 
about specific episodes is necessary but usually insufficient. When combined with 
evidence of systemic practices and evidence that the practices violate customary or 
professional standards, it can support a finding of systemic violation, but there are 
no clear lines that define a sufficient showing.95 
It is arguable that a fourth element of the prima facie case should be political 
blockage. As we have noted, it is naïve to suppose that the political process will 
routinely correct the systemic deficiencies in the defendant’s activities. However, 
there may be situations in which politically induced correction seems imminent or 
under way. Courts do not speak of political blockage as an element of the prima facie 
case, and they usually do not assess political circumstances beyond ritual 
acknowledgment of the principle of presumptive deference to executive (and state) 
authority. However, the likelihood that systemic violations will be corrected without 
court intervention is relevant to the traditional equitable requirement of irreparable 
injury. If self-correction is imminent, judicial intervention is not necessary to avoid 
irreparable injury. Occasionally, courts do recognize recently initiated reforms as a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. The plaintiffs must also show standing—a discrete and imminent personal injury that 
will be remedied by the requested relief. This requirement is easily satisfied in many cases. 
The most notable exception involves policing, where City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 
95 (1983), held that standing to seek injunctive relief against a practice of unlawful choke 
holds did not arise either from the fact that the plaintiff had been subjected to the hold in the 
past or that he routinely used the streets patrolled by the police who engaged in the practice. 
According to the case, the plaintiff would have to show that the plaintiff was distinctively 
likely to be subjected to the practice in the future. Id. at 111. This requirement has made police 
cases more difficult, but it has not proven insuperable. Moreover, standing is not a problem 
for the federal government, which has authority under 42 U.S.C § 14141 (2012) to bring cases 
challenging patterns and practices of unlawful police conduct. 
 95. For a police case involving all these types of proof, see Floyd v. City of N.Y., 813 F. 
Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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reason for denying or deferring systemic relief.96 This is akin to the implicit 
requirement that a Chapter 11 case be commenced in “good faith,” which is often 
taken to mean that the debtor’s problems are multilateral and cannot readily be 
resolved by a traditional legal mechanism.97 
C. The Problem of Representation 
Since the basic rationales for both bankruptcy reorganization and PLL assume 
collective action problems that make direct participation of all affected parties 
infeasible, the interests of at least some stakeholders in both types of cases must be 
protected through representation. Thus, both fields have doctrines and structures 
designed to make representation effective. In general, these representatives are the 
key participants in formulating reforms for the organization. 
1. Bankruptcy 
The problems of scale that impede coordination prior to bankruptcy do not vanish 
when a company enters the process: a corporate debtor will have just as many 
creditors as before (if not more) after it goes into bankruptcy.98 Chapter 11 manages 
this through “official” committees of unsecured creditors (and sometimes other 
stakeholders)99 and, in some cases, through unofficial, or ad hoc, committees.100 
“Official” creditors’ committees will be appointed in most large Chapter 11 cases, 
composed of creditors holding the seven largest unsecured claims willing to serve.101 
In theory, members of the official committee of unsecured creditors are fiduciaries 
for the debtor’s larger body of unsecured creditors and must be “representative” of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(noting as reason for refusing to certify class seeking systemic relief that, even if the plaintiffs 
established liability at trial, “the Court may not have been in a position to provide for more 
relief than simply encouraging continued effort and improvement by [the defendant]”); see 
also HAAR, supra note 31, at 15–69 (reporting that the judge in the Boston Harbor case 
repeatedly invited political officials to moot judicial intervention by formulating a remedial 
plan on their own initiative and entered an injunction only after concluding they were not 
likely to do so without a court order). 
 97. See generally Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor 
Opportunism, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035 (2011). 
 98. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2012) (prepetition creditors can file bankruptcy claims). 
 99. See id. § 1102(a). 
 100. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis 
of the Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749, 777 
(2011). 
 101. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (2012). Official committees usually exclude secured creditors as 
well as shareholders. See id. Secured creditors are generally presumed to prefer strategies that 
maximize the value of their collateral, which may conflict with the debtor’s continued use of 
the collateral. See Harner & Marincic, supra note 100, at 763. Shareholders, by contrast, are 
likely to prefer high-risk/reward strategies that may waste the debtor’s residual value 
(although, as noted, if it appears that a debtor’s equity has some value, a court may in rare 
cases appoint a committee of equity security holders to represent shareholders). See id. at 757 
n.44. Employees may serve on a creditors’ committee, although that is somewhat unlikely. 
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that body.102 This can be problematic where different creditors may have claims 
against different debtors in the corporate group or their claims arose in different ways 
(e.g., contract versus tort, bondholders versus employees). Moreover, it often glosses 
over differences in the normative salience of the underlying conduct giving rise to 
claims.103 Both tort victims and trade creditors are likely to be unsecured creditors of 
a corporate debtor. 
However constituted, an official committee is granted powers under the 
Bankruptcy Code to investigate the debtor's affairs, participate in the restructuring 
process, and pursue causes of action against those who may have harmed the 
corporate debtor if managers of the debtor decline to do so.104 The debtor’s estate—
not individual creditors—bears the expenses of the committee members and the fees 
and expenses of the professionals the committee retains (e.g., lawyers and 
accountants).105  
The creditors’ committee’s most important role is usually in the negotiation of a 
reorganization plan for the debtor, the key instrument by which the debtor will be 
restructured.106 Management of the corporate debtor has the exclusive right to 
promulgate such a plan for the first 120 days of the case.107 The committee is 
expected to review and react to it using confidential information provided by the 
debtor about its operations and prospects.108 Prior to plan promulgation, the 
committee is expected to negotiate with the debtor’s management and other major 
stakeholders (e.g., secured creditors) about major actions in the case, such as requests 
by the debtor to borrow money during the case or to continue or reject executory 
contracts.109 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2012); see also In re Bohack Corp. v. Gulf & W. Indus. 
Inc., 607 F.2d 258, 262 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that creditor’s committee represents the interest 
of all creditors and must carry out its fiduciary duty so as to safeguard the rights of the minority 
as well as the majority of creditors). 
 103. This has been especially so in the cases of Catholic dioceses confronting significant 
liability for sexual misconduct by priests. See Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The 
Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 363 (2006). Although not conventional 
corporate debtors, these religious organizations have used Chapter 11 just as the airlines and 
asbestos-makers have. Id. at 364–65. Yet, as one of us has observed, they present acute 
examples of the problems of cashing legal claims out: “It may be that other mechanisms of 
reconciliation and resolution would produce better results than those generated by our system. 
. . . [O]ur current thinking about bankruptcy fails to account for cases like those involving 
diocesan debtors.” Id. at 370. 
 104. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 
548 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 105. ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 
42–43 (2015). 
 106. Israel Goldowitz, Garth Wilson, Erin Kim & Kirsten Bender, The PBGC Wins a Case 
Whenever the Debtor Keeps Its Pension Plan, 16 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L.R. 257, 
289 (2015). 
 107. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2012). 
 108. Id. § 1103(c).  
 109. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 106.  
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As in all aggregate litigations, a central concern involves the fidelity of those who 
represent the debtor’s body of stakeholders.110 In the early twentieth century, the 
reorganization system was plagued with complaints that “protective committees” 
acted not for the benefit of the widely dispersed bondholders they supposedly 
protected, but instead the insiders who controlled the debtor corporation.111 These 
concerns led to major changes in reorganization practice, such that today the 
committee structure is policed by the U.S. Trustee, a public official who assures that 
both committees and the professionals they retain act in the interests of those they 
represent.112 
In large Chapter 11 cases, there may be, in addition to (or possibly in lieu of) an 
official committee, one or more “ad hoc” committees of stakeholders.113 These are 
informal groups of stakeholders with a common agenda. For example, holders of 
certain classes of bonds issued by a debtor may form an ad hoc committee to pursue 
collectively a position they consider to be advantageous.114 Because ad hoc 
committee members are not fiduciaries, observers worry that they may be 
excessively litigious or, in extreme cases, take opportunistic positions that harm the 
reorganization effort.115 Although modern practice includes a number of mechanisms 
to prevent the abuses of the protective committee, there remain concerns that the 
aggressive tactics ad hoc committees sometimes take may undermine the 
effectiveness of the official committees that are expected to be more broadly 
representative.  
Despite these imperfections, representative participation through official and 
unofficial committees is considered the most effective available means of policing 
and negotiating with management in order to restructure the debtor. These 
representatives likely have a better understanding of the debtor’s business than would 
the court, so their participation is critical to restructuring the company. 
2. Public Law Litigation 
Representation occurs in PLL in two principal ways. First, through the class action 
mechanism, the named plaintiffs’ lawyers purport to represent an entire class of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Harner & Marincic, supra note 100, at 764 n.81 (“[T]he individuals constituting a 
committee should be honest, loyal, trustworthy and without conflicting interests, and with 
undivided loyalty and allegiance to their constituents.”) (quoting Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 
v. Doan (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 919, 925 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
 111. SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE 
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION 
COMMITTEES (1937), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/wp-content/uploads 
/2011/05/Justice-Douglas-SEC-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF3Z-9LBD].  
 112. See In re Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1990) (describing the United 
States trustee as “a watchdog rather than an advocate” protecting the public interest). 
 113. See Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 
1639–45 (2009) (discussing unofficial, or ad hoc committees, in Chapter 11 cases). 
 114. Id.  
 115. See Letter from Hon. Robert E. Gerber to Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules 6 (Jan. 
9, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/BK2009-03.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/756P-GB24]. 
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similarly interested people, and judges have some responsibility to assess the 
typicality of the named plaintiffs’ claims and the ability of their lawyer to represent 
the entire class.116 Defendants can defeat or impede a suit by showing inadequate or 
biased representation, so they sometimes purport to act as watchdogs for the 
underrepresented members of the plaintiff class.117 Once the class is certified, its 
lawyers have fiduciary duties to both the class representatives with whom they are 
in personal contact and the unnamed class members.118  
Second, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) participate as parties and/or as 
sponsors and employers of the plaintiffs’ lawyers. NGOs have structures designed to 
make them accountable to their members or beneficiaries.119 These structures involve 
a managing board sometimes elected by members, and in any event, with fiduciary 
duties to serve the organization’s purposes. 
The class and, a fortiori, the NGO structures create only weak and amorphous 
accountability. Weak accountability may be tolerable to the extent conflicts are not 
intense. In practice, there is often broad consensus within the plaintiff class, and the 
representatives are usually altruistically motivated. Yet, major disputes sometimes 
emerge, and, as with ad hoc committees in Chapter 11 cases, representatives are 
sometimes accused of bias. In the landmark Pennhurst case120 brought on behalf of 
institutionalized developmentally disabled children, class counsel advocated single-
mindedly for deinstitutionalization despite the fact that many parents of children in 
the class thought their children would have been better served by improving the 
institutions.121 The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, which sponsored 
many school desegregation cases, pushed for years for racial balancing even in 
predominantly minority districts where many blacks believed such efforts futile or 
excessively costly.122 Blacks who favored a shift to remedies focused on improving 
the quality of schools in minority neighborhoods felt they were not fairly represented 
by the NAACP lawyers.123 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (prescribing as prerequisites of a class action that the claims of 
the representatives be “typical” and that they will “fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class”). 
 117. Moreover, decrees are occasionally open to collateral attack by affected unrepresented 
interests. Such challenges are occasionally mounted by public employee unions. Compare 
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting collateral challenge by firefighters’ union to 
consent decree mandating race-based hiring practices), with Floyd v. City of N.Y., 770 F.3d 
1051 (2d Cir. 2014) (denying motion of police union to intervene after trial to challenge on 
appeal decree mandating reforms to stop-and-frisk practices judgment on ground of 
timeliness). 
 118. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 119. See Bob Carlson, Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and Charitable Assets, in 
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 203 (Emily Myers & Lynne Ross 
eds., 3d ed. 2013). 
 120. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
 121. Robert Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 265, 354 (Robert 
Mnookin ed., 1985); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89. 
 122. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 489–93 (1976). 
 123. Id. 
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In principle, intervention is possible for stakeholders dissatisfied with the lead 
plaintiffs’ positions, and it is possible for plaintiff subclasses to be formed to contend 
for competing positions. However, intervention requires organization and resources 
and is therefore not routinely forthcoming. Intervention has sometimes occurred in 
school desegregation cases,124 but it is rare in most areas. In some cases, a stakeholder 
unrepresented in the original action may be able to attack the decree collaterally in a 
later one.125 Most stakeholders, however, would not be able to assert a sufficient 
interest for collateral attack. In addition, like widely dispersed creditors of a 
corporate debtor, most will lack the resources to pursue it.126 
A final concern involves conflicts of interest on the defense side. Critics are 
troubled by the fact that administrators sometimes do not strongly contest the 
plaintiffs’ claims and instead settle quickly. They speculate that such agreement 
might be motivated by the prospect of expanded resources from the decree or the 
desire to entrench favored policies against revision.127 Of course, in principle, 
defendants are subject to mechanisms of accountability to the public, the very 
mechanisms to which critics point when they urge courts to defer to officials on 
grounds of democracy. But such mechanisms are clearly imperfect. 
Moreover, administrators’ willingness to recognize the legitimacy of plaintiffs’ 
concerns is analogous to corporate managers’ recognition that a voluntary 
bankruptcy will ultimately serve all stakeholders better than individual collection 
actions when the corporation is in distress. In both spheres, managers may plausibly 
believe that coordination problems require the aid of the court to bring the parties 
together to solve issues being pressed by multiple stakeholders. 
D. The Formulation of the Remedy  
Restructuring troubled organizations requires substantial stakeholder 
participation. In the kinds of bankruptcy and PLL cases on which we focus, the 
parties take the primary role in formulating the remedy. In bankruptcy, the role of 
the court is less to define the remedy than to induce the parties to engage with each 
other and to police the effectiveness of the process. The court’s role is similar in 
many PLL cases, though it is more often called on in these cases to impose a remedy 
where the parties fail to reach agreement. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on 
the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REV. 244 (1977). 
 125. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting collateral attack by white 
firefighters on a decree remedying racial discrimination in employment). Some PLL 
proponents oppose collateral attack for reasons partly analogous to the rationale for the 
prohibition of individual creditor actions in bankruptcy: it aggravates coordination problems 
and impedes a coherent resolution of the systemic problems. Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of 
Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965 (1993). 
 126. Nevertheless, while representation in connection with the formulation of the decree 
can be limited, there is a tendency for the contemporary framework decrees to provide for 
increased stakeholder participation in implementation. See infra Section II.E. 
 127. E.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 122–23; Michael McConnell, Why 
Hold Elections?: Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. 
CHI. L. F. 295, 297. 
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1. Bankruptcy 
The overarching remedial goal in bankruptcy is the formulation and confirmation 
of a “plan” that restructures the debtor.128 The plan is a comprehensive instrument 
designed both to correct organizational dysfunction and to assure the likely survival 
of the reformed debtor. 
The Bankruptcy Code contains a fairly elaborate set of rules and standards to 
approve (“confirm”) a reorganization plan, and each step constitutes an opportunity 
for stakeholder participation. First, the plan must have been presented to creditors in 
a “disclosure statement” that contains “adequate information” about the plan and the 
debtor sufficient to enable creditors to vote for or against the plan.129 As a practical 
matter, the hearing on the motion to approve the disclosure statement will often 
channel—and consensually resolve—objections to the plan itself. 
Second, the plan must have a minimum level of stakeholder support, generally 
speaking, two-thirds in dollar amount and more than half in number of creditors 
entitled to vote.130 Outside of Chapter 11, debt obligations and associated property 
rights (e.g., liens) can be modified only if all (or almost all) creditors so agree.131 In 
Chapter 11, by contrast, the plan proponent (probably management) must place 
creditors in classes and then proposes “treatment” for those classes (e.g., payment of 
a percentage of the claim in cash, issuing new securities, etc.), which each class 
accepts or rejects by supermajority vote.132 The logic of Chapter 11 substitutes 
bargaining and the ballot for strict recognition of all prebankruptcy entitlements.  
A court may confirm the plan over the dissent of one or more classes so long as 
at least one impaired class has approved the plan, and the court finds that the plan 
does not “discriminate unfairly” and is “fair and equitable.”133 The “unfair 
discrimination” standard prohibits differences in the treatment of classes that are not 
justified by legitimate business reasons.134 “Fair and equitable” is a term of art which 
operationalizes the so-called “absolute priority rule” (APR).135 The APR is a core 
distributional norm, providing that dissenting unsecured creditors may be bound to 
the plan provided that all junior interests are eliminated.136 This has the effect of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. Lipson & Marotta, supra note 24, at 11. In an unsuccessful reorganization, the 
“remedy” will be conversion to a case under Chapter 7 and hence liquidation, or dismissal of 
the case, which will in turn most likely result in rapid, piecemeal sale of the debtor’s assets. 
See id. at 37.  
 129. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2012). 
 130. Id. § 1126(c). As discussed below, this glosses over some complexity. 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 60–61. 
 132. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (2012) (requiring plan to “designate, subject to section 1122 
of this title, classes of claims”). 
 133. Id. § 1129(b). 
 134. The court has substantial discretion in defining legitimacy. For example, in the 
Chrysler bankruptcy, certain unsecured creditors complained that superior treatment for union 
claims was unfairly discriminatory—to no avail. See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing 
the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 758 (2010). 
 135. Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 84 (1991). 
 136. See, e.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 64, at 130; Markell, supra note 135, at 74–
84 (describing the absolute priority rule as foundational). 
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forcing those most likely in historic control of the debtor (shareholders) either to 
propose a plan that in fact induces widespread support or to give up their rights. The 
prospect of an imposed plan—a “cramdown”—operates as a penalty default, a rule 
that threatens a suboptimal outcome in order to induce the better-informed parties to 
disclose information that might lead to a better result.137 Consensus often forms in 
the shadow of cramdown. 
Management and committees will usually employ experts to advise them on the 
business steps needed to achieve a plan that is, among other things, “feasible.”138 
These or other experts may be called on to testify at the hearing to confirm the plan 
in order to enable the bankruptcy judge to assess the plausibility of the proposals 
contained in the plan.139 
2. Public Law Litigation  
As in bankruptcy, remedies in PLL most often arise from stakeholder 
participation, in particular negotiation. Many cases settle before a judicial ruling on 
the merits, and these settlements stipulate remedies which will usually be 
incorporated in a court order, or “consent decree.”140  
If the case proceeds to judgment and the plaintiff wins on the merits, public law 
doctrine, like bankruptcy, requires that management be given the first opportunity to 
propose a remedy.141 The plaintiffs will invariably have counter-proposals. The court 
will respond by encouraging settlement. Indeed, anticipating such differences, the 
parties will usually begin negotiating over the remedy from the point at which 
liability is established. 
For the defendant, the possibility that it can negotiate a remedy more favorable 
than the one the court would impose is usually a strong incentive to deal with the 
plaintiffs. From the plaintiff’s point of view, a negotiated decree has the advantage 
that compliance may be more likely with an order that the defendants have influenced 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989). 
 138. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012); see infra text accompanying notes 147–148. 
 139. See, e.g., In re American HomePatient, Inc., 298 B.R. 152 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2003), 
subsequently aff’d, 420 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 140. Defendants would usually prefer to settle on the basis of agreements subject to 
contractual enforcement that are not incorporated into decrees. Leonard Koerner, Institutional 
Reform Litigation, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 509, 515 (2008) (reporting such a practice in New York 
City). This course gives the defendants more leverage in the event of later disputes over 
compliance. The plaintiff cannot respond with a motion for contempt in an ongoing action but 
must file a new action and obtain an order mandating specific performance. It can seek 
contempt only when there is failure to comply with the new order. In addition, the plaintiff 
may have to bring actions to enforce the contract in state court, where defendant state officials 
would often be more comfortable. Plaintiffs sometimes agree to such arrangements in order to 
avoid protracted litigation over liability. See Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: 
Settlement Agreements and Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275 
(2010). In some cases, the defendant undertakes some commitments under a consent decree 
and others under a contract. Id. at 318. 
 141. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1971). 
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and agreed to. From the court’s point of view, a negotiated remedy avoids difficult 
and costly proceedings.142  
As in bankruptcy, if the parties cannot agree, the court must impose a remedy. 
Except in cases involving narrow issues with clear substantive rules, the liability 
finding will not imply a specific remedy. The court will have to craft one from 
competing adversarial presentations. The competing presentations tend to be 
dominated by expert testimony from both defendant officials and experts hired by 
both sides. The court is likely to mandate practices required by norms in the relevant 
profession, as described by the experts it finds most credible.143  
Whether the remedy is negotiated or imposed, it will be strongly influenced by 
experts, either as witnesses or consultants to the parties. Plaintiffs are often able to 
retain experts who currently hold or are retired from senior administrative positions 
in agencies like the defendant. They can also draw on standards codified by 
professional associations. Like operational assessments in bankruptcy, PLL judges 
do not make ad hoc judgments about the organization and structure of the agency: 
they rely on negotiation and expert participation. 
E. The Structure of the Decree 
The core of the remedy in each sphere typically involves governance and 
accountability structures negotiated by the parties and their representatives rather 
than sets of specific rules or practices. In both cases, the instruments creating these 
structures seek to restabilize the organization while promising better performance 
through experimental, provisional, and decentralized operating mechanisms. 
1. Bankruptcy 
The key instruments effectuating the debtor’s reorganization will be the 
reorganization plan and the judicial order confirming it.144 Although the plan must 
contain a number of provisions and is likely, as a matter of practice, to contain many 
optional components, two are central to effectuating bankruptcy’s remedial goals.145 
First, the plan must provide, directly or indirectly, for the debtor’s effective 
management. This may require a change in the composition of the board of directors 
or top-level managers, or both. Some management changes may have been made 
during, or even before, bankruptcy. If, however, the major stakeholders have not 
agreed on acceptable management for the debtor, the plan is unlikely to be confirmed.  
The plan will usually provide for governance through ordinary corporate 
mechanisms. For example, it is not uncommon for creditors to have representatives 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. Susan Sturm elaborates the conditions and limits of consensus formation in PLL in 
terms of a “consensual remediation formulation model.” Sturm, supra note 4, at 1421–27. 
 143. E.g., Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d. 668, 681, 683 n.57, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(noting influence of experts on formulation of remedy in police case). 
 144. The term “decree” is not commonly used in the bankruptcy context, but a plan, when 
confirmed by the court, is functionally similar to a PLL decree. A plan “represents a kind of 
consent decree which has many attributes of a contract.” In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 
F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 145. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (2012). 
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sit on the board of directors of the reorganized debtor.146 They will then be in a 
position to monitor the debtor’s performance under the reorganization plan and to 
hold management accountable when there are material deviations. 
Second, the plan will cleanse the debtor’s balance sheet, chiefly through the 
discharge or adjustment of debt. The discharge effectively makes permanent the 
temporary injunction against collection actions imposed through the automatic stay 
upon commencement of the case. It helps to restabilize the debtor by promoting new 
investment in the firm.  
Substantively, the court must find that the plan is “feasible,” meaning that the 
court has determined that “confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by . . 
. liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization” of the debtor.147 
Feasibility requires the reorganization plan to be based on a plausible business plan—
that is, one that suggests that the reforms will last.148 The business plan need not be 
explicitly incorporated in the reorganization plan, but it will have been disclosed to 
(and negotiated with) stakeholders when their vote is solicited, and the court will 
consider it in assessing feasibility.  
Bifurcating the business plan and the reorganization plan permits a level of 
provisionality that can be important to realizing on the promises embedded in the 
plan. A postconfirmation change in market conditions will likely require a change to 
the business plan. Because the business plan is not cemented in the reorganization 
plan, however, changing the former does not necessarily require a (judicially 
dependent) change to the latter. This, in turn, permits more efficient postconfirmation 
adjustment in response to feedback from stakeholders, who will probably have a 
more direct role in monitoring, and perhaps governing, the reorganized firm after 
bankruptcy. 
Following entry of the confirmation order, the most important work in 
restructuring the debtor will occur in short order, if it has not already occurred. Thus, 
there is not a long period after confirmation in which the court is likely to play an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. This follows from the fact that debtors who reorganize under Chapter 11 often pay 
unsecured creditors in part or in full in new shares of stock of the debtor, and those shares 
must have voting power under the Bankruptcy Code. See Michelle M. Harner, Trends in 
Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 69, 103 n.47 (2008) (discussing issuance of shares in Kmart reorganization). 
Bankruptcy Code section 1123(a)(6) generally prohibits corporate debtors from issuing 
nonvoting shares under a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(6) (2012). 
 147. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012). 
 148. Compare In re Om Shivai, Inc., 447 B.R. 459 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (Chapter 11 plan 
proposed by debtor whose principal asset consisted of twenty-seven room motel was not 
“feasible” and could not be confirmed, where debtor had experienced positive cash flow, and 
then only in minimal amount, in only four of past eight months while operating as debtor-in-
possession, where debtor’s plan required it to pay significantly more to its creditors than it had 
shown ability to pay in past), with In re Red Mountain Mach. Co., 448 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
2011), stay pending appeal denied, 451 B.R. 897 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011) and aff’d, 471 B.R. 
242 (D. Ariz. 2012) (projections prepared by Chapter 11 debtors’ chief restructuring officer, 
the same individual whose projections debtors had consistently met and exceeded while 
operating as Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession, along with the unrebutted testimony of debtors’ 
expert, were sufficient to show that debtors’ proposed Chapter 11 plan was “feasible,” as 
required for confirmation). 
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important, ongoing role in the debtor’s reorganization. If the debtor makes the 
payments or transfers contemplated in the plan, then except as the underlying 
instruments might provide (e.g., earnings covenants), there will be no basis for 
judicial assessment. If, instead, the debtor defaults on its plan-created obligations, it 
is possible that the bankruptcy court would be asked to intercede—but it is just as 
likely that the entire debt collection process might start again (e.g., with a state-court 
collection suit, etc.). 
2. Public Law Litigation 
Key norms hold that the scope of the violation limits the scope of the remedy and 
that the decree should not require more than is necessary to achieve compliance.149 
These norms provide little guidance, however. Even where the substantive wrong 
can be defined precisely, the measures needed to prevent its recurrence are not 
usually deducible from the wrong. The court can enjoin physical assaults on 
prisoners, but where systemic past violation of this norm has been demonstrated, 
deterrence will require more. Professional standards may be helpful in specifying the 
required measures, but they are rarely beyond debate. The matter is further 
complicated by the precept that, even if a norm is necessary to deter the conduct in 
question, the court may forego it if it would be too disruptive of other legitimate 
activities and goals.150 
Moreover, the issue of whether a given measure is “necessary” involves an 
ambiguity where, as is usually the case, there are multiple reasonable approaches to 
prevention. It may be necessary to adopt one of the measures, but not any particular 
one. Thus, the issue is better described as whether the measures chosen by the parties 
or the court are “reasonable.”151 
Some decrees may contain only narrowly tailored provisions. For example, a 
recent consent decree in Mississippi provides that the defendant school system will 
not use handcuffs as punishment for noncriminal student behavior or for any kind of 
behavior by students under thirteen years old.152 Even such a focused decree, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. E.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357–58 (1996); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 
88 (1995). This stricture does not apply as a constitutional or common law principle to consent 
decrees. However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act applies it to all decrees addressing prison 
conditions. 18 U.S.C § 3626(a)(1) (2012). 
 150. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531, 
557 (1983) (noting that mandating immediate release of prisoners would sometimes be the 
only effective way of immediately remedying unconstitutional detention but that “release is 
never the remedy of first resort” and that courts balance the prisoner’s interests against “other 
legitimate social concerns”). 
 151. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 439 (2004), rejected the claim that a remedy cannot 
go beyond the specific requirements of substantive law. “The decree does implement the 
Medicaid statute in a highly detailed way, requiring the state officials to take some steps that 
the statute does not specifically require. The same could be said, however, of any effort to 
implement the . . . statute in a particular way.” Id. The Court concluded that the decree should 
be approved as long as it represents “reasonable and necessary implementations of federal 
law.” Id. at 441. 
 152. Order Approving Settlement, A.M. v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Bd. of Trs., No. 3:11CV344-
TSL-MTP (S.D. Miss. May 25, 2012). 
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however, will usually require elaboration of the duty in written policies, 
communication of the policies to officials and the public, training of affected public 
actors, and some monitoring. The Mississippi school decree prescribes measures of 
these kinds, including an “oversight council” composed of students, parents, 
advocates, and a mental health professional.153 
A major category of decrees sweeps more broadly into the administration of the 
defendant agency. The dominant approach of recent decrees of this kind is a 
departure from earlier practice. Earlier decrees were often a collection of many 
specific rules like the Mississippi handcuff rule. A decree with respect to prison 
conditions might specify the minimum space for cells or the temperature of water in 
the showers.154 Modern decrees may still contain some such rules, but they tend to 
focus on general management functions of self-monitoring and assessment and on 
transparency and accountability. An important goal of the decrees is a higher-
functioning organization, sufficiently stable to self-correct based on a commitment 
to and investment in ongoing internal quality improvement practices and policies.155  
Although there is much variation, we can give a general idea by describing typical 
elements of the most ambitious decrees. Such decrees try to create a framework of 
ongoing elaboration and adaptation.  
They may begin with a general statement of goals or norms (e.g., prison guards 
should “mak[e] reasonable effort to resolve [inmate encounters] without force,”156 or 
“services to [disabled individuals] shall be provided in the most integrated setting 
appropriate to meet their needs”).157  
They may then mandate some upfront structural investments. These might include 
enhanced information technology for recording and tracking data and increased 
personnel.158 The ecosystem decrees may require important new physical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement, Certification of Settlement 
Class, and to Set a Date for a Fairness Hearing, A.M. v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Bd. of Trs., No. 
3:11CV344-TSL-MTP (S.D. Miss. May 25, 2012). 
 154. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING IN THE MODERN 
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 40–41 (1998) (discussing decrees 
that “specify many requirements in . . . painstaking or excruciating detail [including] the 
wattage of the light bulbs in the cells, the frequency of showers, and the caloric content of 
meals”). 
 155. Sabel & Simon, supra note 40, at 38. 
 156. Stipulation of Settlement at 5, Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 1998) (No. 1:91CV04148), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-NY 
-0001-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/R72S-R9W6]. 
 157. Settlement Agreement at 1, United States v. Delaware, No. 1:11-cv-00591-LPS (D. 
Del. Oct. 26, 2011), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-DE-0003-0002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UX5L-TFQU]. 
 158. E.g., Rosie D. v. Romney, 474 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D. Mass. 2007) (describing planning 
and infrastructure development provisions to remedy violations of Medicaid statute); 
Agreement for Effective and Constitutional Policing at 38–41, United States v. Town of East 
Haven, No. 3:12-cv-01652-AWT (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2012) [hereinafter East Haven 
Agreement], https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CT-0001-0004.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/6XWQ-JLA4] (police case). 
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infrastructure. For example, the San Joaquin River Restoration Project decree 
required the construction of new channels and ladders to accommodate fish.159  
The core requirements of framework decrees concern management practices of 
policy-making, monitoring, and reassessment. Management must develop explicit 
policies or plans for matters that may previously have been left to tacit discretion. 
Police agencies, for example, may be required to develop and implement explicit 
use-of-force policies.160 Prisons may be required to have protocols for responding to 
medical needs of patients. Child welfare agencies may be required to have both 
general case plans for children in their custody due to abuse or neglect and specific 
“permanency” plans for each child in their care.161  
When they are developed, these policies are likely to have as much or more 
specificity as the highly directive decrees of the past. However, because under 
current practice the policies are usually not themselves part of the decree, they can 
be readily revised without approval of the court. Revision typically requires 
consultation with, or at least notice to, the plaintiffs and/or a monitor. The plaintiffs 
will have opportunities to object to them, perhaps in some mandated consultation or 
dispute settlement process, and as a last resort, before the court.162 But the decree 
contemplates frequent policy change and often allows defendants to modify the 
strategies or tactics they employ to reach the goals of the decree. For example, in a 
child welfare case, “permanency” will be a goal for all children in the state’s custody, 
but the defendant can experiment with different practices to achieve it. 
The agency also commits to monitor itself in a transparent fashion. This means 
collecting and reporting data on both the implementation and the efficacy of the 
reforms. The decree may specify metrics, or it may order the defendant to develop 
them, perhaps in consultation with the plaintiffs or with an expert consultant or 
monitor. Other provisions may require intensive scrutiny of specific cases or 
incidents. For example, police decrees prescribe routine review of use-of-force 
episodes and “early warning” procedures that intervene with counseling, training, or 
discipline where data identifies officers as outliers in terms of such factors as uses of 
force, vehicle accidents, complaints, or absences. These decrees will often mandate 
or regulate the procedures of an independent civilian complaint review agency.163 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. Settlement Stipulation at 8–10, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Rodgers, 381 F.Supp.2d 
1212 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2006) (No. CIV.S-88-1658 LKK), https://www.usbr.gov 
/mp/nepa/includes/documentShow.php?Doc_ID=3894 [https://perma.cc/X656-SV2B]. 
 160. E.g., East Haven Agreement, supra note 158, at 8–12. 
 161. E.g., Kathleen Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal Accountability 
in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 523, 538–41 (2009) (describing Utah child welfare settlement); Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement at 7–10, D.G. v. Yarbrough, No. 08-CV-074-GKF-FHM (N.D. Okla. 
2012) [hereinafter Oklahoma Child Welfare Compromise], https://www.clearinghouse 
.net/chDocs/public/CW-OK-0001-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XYN-924E]. 
 162. E.g., Oklahoma Child Welfare Compromise, supra note 161, ¶ 2.10(g)-(f), at 8–9; 
East Haven Agreement, supra note 158, ¶ 29, at 12, ¶ 197, at 47–48. 
 163. E.g., East Haven Agreement, supra note 158, at 22–38. See generally WALKER & 
ARCHBOLD, supra note 40, at 106–08 (discussing consent decrees). 
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Some procedures, such as the “Quality Service Review,” used in the Utah child 
welfare decree, intensively assess a sample of cases.164 The quality assurance system 
developed under the California prison decree reviews data on all medical care and 
then examines a sample in more detail.165 These procedures generally track the 
tendency of modern public administration to appraise frontline practice qualitatively 
rather than in terms of compliance with specific rules or with documentation 
requirements. The qualitative data also generates more nuanced case information that 
enables defendants to adapt frontline practice contemporaneously.  
In addition, the defendant must reassess the policies periodically or continuously 
in the light of experience. For example, the Seattle police settlement prescribes 
creation of a Community Police Commission, with broad representation, to review 
performance data and recommend policy changes. It also mandates a Use of Force 
Committee within the department charged with reviewing reports to determine when 
practice changes are indicated.166 Ecosystem decrees sometimes mandate increased 
use of “adaptive management.” For example, the San Joaquin River Restoration 
decree altered the defendants’ water management practices to require more rapid and 
nuanced response to indications of danger to the fish population. Prior to the decree, 
managers released water to protect fish in accordance with fixed schedules.167 The 
decree required that they monitor the condition of the fish continuously and adjust 
water release continuously.168 
The emphasis on provisionality and reassessment leads some courts to mandate 
explicit experimentation. The New York police decree mandated that the defendant 
undertake a one-year “pilot project” with patrol officers wearing body-worn cameras 
in one precinct in each of the city’s five boroughs.169 At the end of the year, the 
monitor was directed to report on results and deliberate with the parties over whether 
the practice should be adopted generally. 
Decrees often provide for monitors or masters. These judicial officers will be 
appointed by the court, usually from nominations by the parties, and sometimes 
pursuant to their agreement.170 They are typically experts in the field. These officers 
will have broad access to data on relevant defendant activities. They will periodically 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. Noonan et al., supra note 161, at 542–48. 
 165. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, REPORTS: MEDICAL 
INSPECTIONS, http://www.oig.ca.gov/pages/reports.php# [https://perma.cc/BW7Z-Q4E8]. 
 166. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated (Proposed) Order of Resolution at ¶¶ 3–12, 
119–25, United States v. City of Seattle No. 2:12-cv-01282JLR (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-WA-0001-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/MDK2-UJJV]. The DOJ’s “Principles for Promoting Police Integrity”—a starting point for 
remedial design in many cases—demand continuous review of various data to determine 
“whether any revisions to training or practices are necessary.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY 6 (2001). 
 167. See Settlement Stipulation, supra note 159. 
 168. Notice of Lodgment of Stipulation of Settlement, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Rodgers, 
381 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (No. CIV.S-88-1658 LKK), https://www.usbr.gov/mp 
/nepa/includes/documentShow.php?Doc_ID=7565 [https://perma.cc/MU5S-BLLM]; SAN 
JOAQUIN RIVER GRP. AUTH., 2010 ANNUAL TECHNICAL REPORT 3 (2010). 
 169. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 170. See Susan Sturm, Note, “Mastering” Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 
(1979). 
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assess the defendant’s progress toward compliance and report it to the court. They 
may provide information to the plaintiffs and mediate disputes between the defendant 
and the plaintiffs over compliance issues.171  
The monitoring provisions will often remain in effect for many years after entry 
of the decree, and they typically contemplate periodic reports to the court and 
episodic judicial intervention to resolve disputes about implementation. This feature 
of PLL differs from bankruptcy. While the boards of corporate debtors may provide 
a monitoring mechanism for creditors, a formal monitor is unlikely to be appointed 
during or after plan confirmation. 
PLL decrees last longer than Chapter 11 plans and may appear somewhat more 
directive. But modern decrees have much in common with Chapter 11 plans. Both 
effect change at the organizational level through adjustments to the defendant’s 
management and governance. Both require some degree of monitoring and 
flexibility. Both create mechanisms that subject their management and governance 
structures to enhanced accountability and transparency. These structural adjustments 
are attractive because they offer greater likelihood of success than traditional 
adjudication. 
F. Financing Reform 
In both spheres, the court cannot order the provision of financing (with rare 
exceptions in PLL). Rather, it is up to the debtor or defendant, sometimes with the 
help of stakeholders, to find financing either by reallocating funds it controls or by 
inducing outsiders to invest in the reformed institution. 
1. Bankruptcy 
In bankruptcy, creditor pressure may free existing resources by reducing 
unproductive spending that resulted from managerial self-indulgence or inattention. 
This tighter managerial discipline may also make the enterprise a more attractive 
investment. At the same time, the discharge of debt and the management changes in 
the plan will often induce new investment. 
As noted above, to gain approval as “feasible,” the reorganization plan also must 
contain credible financing mechanisms. Increasingly, debtors restructure by selling 
unproductive or nonessential assets under or in connection with a plan.172 This 
permits reorganized debtors to concentrate on core operations that, stakeholders 
hope, will prove more profitable in the future. In some cases, outside investors (e.g., 
Fiat’s acquisition of Chrysler) take an interest in the company and help finance its 
exit.173 However a debtor finances its operations postconfirmation, those 
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. Id. at 1068–72. 
 172. See Chrysler Sold to Fiat-Led “New Chrysler” After Historic Court Proceedings, 
JONES DAY (Aug. 2009) [hereinafter Chrysler Sold], http://www.jonesday.com/chrysler-sells-
assets-to-fiat-led-new-chrysler-after-unprecedented-court-proceedings [https://perma.cc 
/4YJ5-89RJ]. 
 173. Id. 
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arrangements will be subject to contract law and other rules that are largely outside 
the scope of the bankruptcy process.174  
2. Public Law Litigation 
In public law litigation, courts cannot discharge obligations of the defendant, and 
public defendants may have less discretion than private ones to shift funds among 
different uses. Nevertheless, two of the routes by which bankruptcy produces 
funds—more efficient use of existing resources and new investment attracted by a 
better operating plan—are often available. 
Defendants commonly plead inadequate resources as a reason for the court to 
forego or minimize intervention. They also often stress that only the legislature has 
the authority to commit new funds to reform. Courts are sometimes sympathetic, 
especially to the separation of powers issues.175 But, just as frequently, they view 
such claims as inconsistent with the rule of law.176 
Reform does not always entail increased expense. Ordering decreased 
incarceration or the cessation of police practices that generate lawsuits may actually 
reduce expenses (though it might generate less measurable costs in terms of increased 
crime). Moreover, as in bankruptcy, reformed management practices will sometimes 
improve use of existing funds or expand access to new funding. In approving a 
receivership for the Boston Housing Authority, for example, the court noted that the 
agency had been impaired in seeking funding by its failure to produce meaningful 
budgets, in part because it had failed for more than eight months to fill a funded 
budget officer position.177 Frequently, improved management enables the defendant 
to increase receipt of resources it is already entitled to under programs such as 
Medicaid, special education, and the Section 8 housing voucher program.178 
Where reform requires new resources, courts can order defendants to make their 
best efforts to find them. Where the defendant agency has taxing or bonding 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (2012).  
 175. E.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009) (“When a federal court orders that 
money be appropriated for one program, the effect is often to take funds away from other 
important programs.”); Conor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 985 F. Supp. 2d 129, 157 (D. Mass. 
2013) (explaining denial of relief in part by the fact that “redistribution of scarce governmental 
resources would . . . depriv[e] other state agencies of the means to perform their functions 
fully”). Even before getting to the question of remedy, considerations of scarce public 
resources may influence a court in deciding whether to recognize a substantive right. See Daryl 
J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). 
 176. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963) (“[I]t is obvious that 
vindication of conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that 
it is less expensive to deny than to afford them.”); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 164 F.3d 1261 
(10th Cir. 1998) (affirming order requiring official to complete listing of particular endangered 
species despite his undisputed claim that order would divert resources from enforcement of 
other duties). 
 177. Perez v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1241 (1980). 
 178. See Eighth Report of the Court Monitor at 1–2, United States v. Delaware, No. 1:11-
cv-00591-LPS (D. Del. Dec. 26, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/826976/download 
[https://perma.cc/88C8-ZKD6] (explaining that the defendant had funded much of its 
reorganization with payments from the federal Medicaid program). 
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authority, courts have ordered it to exercise the authority.179 More commonly, they 
order the defendant to apply to the legislature or perhaps private sources for needed 
financial support.180 With perhaps surprising frequency, such support is granted. 
Many decrees have been supported with large legislative appropriations.181 Fresh 
support volunteered by NGOs sometimes plays an important role.182 
G. Defendant Recalcitrance 
In both spheres, courts have difficulty identifying and sanctioning recalcitrance 
by managers of the institution. In neither sphere do damages or monetary penalties 
play a strong role. In both, courts can theoretically resort to extreme sanctions, but 
they rarely do so. Sanctions tend to be indirect. Moreover, informal pressures to 
comply may arise from decree provisions that make compliance efforts and their 
results transparent. 
1. Bankruptcy 
Historically, the bankruptcy process has been preoccupied with concerns about 
management recalcitrance during a case. Because Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code leaves management presumptively in possession and control of the debtor,183 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (holding that district court may require 
school district to raise taxes necessary to implement desegregation order). It has occasionally 
been suggested that federal courts can directly order a state legislature to appropriate needed 
resources, or alternatively, bypass state legislative processes and enact a tax itself. Thomas 
Reed Powell, Coercing a State to Pay a Judgment: Virginia v. West Virginia, 17 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 17–30 (1918) (arguing in context of suit to enforce an interstate compact that federal 
courts sometimes have authority to levy and collect taxes). Although the reach and continued 
validity of this doctrine are unclear, it seems unlikely as a practical matter that a contemporary 
court would issue such orders in PLL. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of 
the Purse, 126 U. PENN. L. REV. 715, 770–71 (1978). 
 180. E.g., United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 588 F. Supp. 132, 139–42 (N.D. Ill.), 
vacated by 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing provision of consent decree obliging 
both parties to make “every good faith effort to find and provide every available form of 
financial resources” for implementation). 
 181. E.g., HAAR, supra note 31, at 200–17 (describing the legislative creation of a new 
agency with borrowing capacity to finance the Boston Harbor clean-up in response to judicial 
orders); San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 1001–10203, 
123 Stat. 991 (2009) (appropriating $88 million to support the settlement agreement in Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. Rodgers, 381 F.Supp.2d 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2006)). In Texas and 
Kentucky education cases based on state constitutional provisions, PLL suits produced 
comprehensive educational reform legislatively supported by statutes and appropriations. See 
James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The 
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
183 (2003). 
 182. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 247–48 (D. Mass. 1975) (describing 
commitments of universities and business groups to assist implementation of Boston school 
desegregation decree).  
 183. Lipson & Marotta, supra note 24, at 1. 
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in the early days of Chapter 11, observers worried that debtors would run amok, 
wasting time and money on professionals, rather than focusing on the reorganization 
effort. The Eastern Airlines bankruptcy is often invoked as an example of excesses 
by managers who were feckless, if not “reckless,” in “managing” the reorganization 
of an airline into a fire-sale liquidation that should have been avoided.184 
Yet, the Bankruptcy Code, and practice under it, offer a variety of tools that can 
significantly temper management’s resistance to improved performance. In some 
cases, they are personal to management; in others, they affect the debtor directly and 
thus management indirectly. Perhaps the most draconian power available to a judge 
is the power to terminate or modify senior management, either by appointing a trustee 
who would replace management, or an examiner to investigate management.185 
While both events are rare in large cases,186 the options to do so likely have an in 
terrorem effect that disciplines management. 
Chapter 11 also contains other, less direct, mechanisms for dealing with 
recalcitrant management, perhaps the most important of which is termination of the 
so-called 120-day “exclusive period” management has to file a plan.187 After that 
point, outsiders can file plans, and these plans are likely to propose new management. 
The threat of losing control in this way disciplines managers who seek to reorganize 
the company and retain their jobs. Chapter 11 also provides positive incentives to 
managers who perform well. For example, corporate debtors may adopt so-called 
“key employee retention programs,” which are essentially incentives to remain with 
the debtor and work toward a successful reorganization.188  
At the entity level, a court may dismiss a case, or convert it to a liquidation under 
Chapter 7.189 This generally has the effect of ending the reorganization effort and, as 
noted above, is very likely to end the debtor as a going concern.190  
If a debtor confirms a plan, and emerges from Chapter 11, the question arises 
whether it will comply with the reorganization plan. Section 1142 of the Bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor 
Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191, 211 
(discussing “repeated extensions of plan exclusivity in Eastern Airlines’ Chapter 11 
proceedings, which led to the erosion of the firm’s asset values and a 93% loss of bondholders’ 
original open market claim value, as largely a preventable, and now a probably unlikely, court 
error”). 
 185. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012). 
 186. Lipson & Marotta, supra note 24, at 37 (“Although rare in all cases, trustee motions 
and appointments were also more likely in large cases compared to small cases. Trustees were 
nearly twice as likely to be sought in large cases (7.6% of small cases; 12.6% of large cases), 
and were over 1.7 times more likely to be appointed in large cases (2.1% of small cases; 3.7% 
of large cases).”). 
 187. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (2012). 
 188. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Where’s the Beef? A Few Words About Paying for 
Performance in Bankruptcy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 64, 67 (2007) (citing In re Dana 
Corp., 358 B.R. 567, 575 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[S]ection 503(c) was not intended to 
foreclose a chapter 11 debtor from reasonably compensating employees, including ‘insiders,’ 
for their contribution to the debtors’ reorganization.”)). 
 189. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1), (4) (2012). 
 190. Conversion and dismissal are rarer among larger than among smaller cases. Lipson & 
Marotta, supra note 24, at 37. 
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Code provides that the debtor “shall carry out the plan and shall comply with any 
orders of the court” and that the court may direct the debtor and other parties to 
“perform any other act,” necessary for the “consummation” of the plan.191 This can 
create a basis for postconfirmation supervision by the court, although bankruptcy 
courts tend to view this narrowly. In part, this may be because the business plan that 
provides the details of the reorganization may not be part of the Chapter 11 plan set 
out in the formal decree. If a debtor fails directly to comply with a provision of the 
reorganization plan, it may be a default that is remedied under section 1142. If, 
however, the debtor defaults on new debt obligations incurred after emerging from 
bankruptcy, creditors will have to resort to ordinary collection mechanisms or 
anticipate that the debtor will commence a subsequent Chapter 11 case.  
2. Public Law Litigation 
Once a PLL decree is in place, there are often significant informal pressures on 
defendants to comply. Defendants may strive to comply because senior agency 
managers recognize the legitimacy of prescribed practices, which are often prevalent 
in peer institutions or supported by professional norms. Few managers, however, 
welcome the intrusion by the court and the plaintiffs in their day-to-day operations, 
and the desire to get out from under their supervision may motivate compliance 
efforts even with demands they resent. State agencies are usually defended by the 
attorney general’s office, and these lawyers will be observing their efforts. In 
addition, the lawsuit and the decree may attract close attention from governors or 
mayors or other senior officials. Depending on the sympathies of these officials, their 
attention may generate added pressures for compliance and exit from the suit. In 
addition, the proceedings and the decree will likely generate media attention. If the 
plaintiffs’ claims are compelling and they are effective in dealing with the media, 
publicity may add to compliance pressure. (However, defendants are sometimes 
successful in inducing countervailing political and media pressure against the court’s 
intervention.) 
Nevertheless, willful or reckless failures to comply are not unusual. When the 
courts conclude that compliance will not follow from its commands alone, it has 
coercive options. It can hold the officials in contempt and impose fines or, in theory, 
incarceration. Appellate doctrine tends to disfavor this course.192 Where the violation 
constitutes a breach of a condition of federal funding, the court can order cessation 
of the funding, though such an order is not likely to facilitate compliance. More 
aggressively, the court can order closure of the program or facility where the 
offending practices occur. Courts are more likely to threaten such action than to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 191. 11 U.S.C. § 1142 (2012). 
 192. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (reversing large contempt fines against 
individual city council members despite findings of long history of obstruction); see also 
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 442–43 (2009) (noting in the course of reversing on other 
grounds that the district court-imposed contempt sanctions of up to two million dollars a day). 
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undertake it, but they have ordered jails or prisons closed193 and have imposed prison 
population caps, which are effectively partial facility closures.194 
Courts can sometimes create pressure for compliance by enjoining collateral 
activities that the defendants wish to undertake until they have completed the 
obligations they resist. For example, a court might enjoin a municipality from 
granting building permits for new construction or a water agency from continuing 
certain deliveries until they undertake action to remedy environmental damage.195 At 
the extreme, where compliance under current management seems hopeless, the 
courts can displace management and turn over control to a receiver. They have done 
so in cases involving housing authorities, jails and prisons, mental health and 
disability institutions, and school systems, among other public institutions.196 This 
is, in important respects, analogous to appointing a trustee to run a large corporate 
debtor in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
In general, courts seem reluctant to adopt coercive measures both because they 
put the court most starkly in opposition to a coordinate branch of government and 
because, if the sanctions prove inadequate to induce compliance, the court will look 
weak or ineffectual. As with cramdown or liquidation in bankruptcy, courts hope that 
the threat of sanctions will be sufficient to overcome recalcitrance. They view 
draconian sanctions as a penalty default designed to induce the defendant to negotiate 
a better remedy with the plaintiffs. 
H. Modifying and Terminating the Decree 
Active judicial involvement in bankruptcy after approval of a Chapter 11 plan 
tends to be minimal, and plans have relatively short terms. Because judicial oversight 
                                                                                                                 
 
 193. Morales Feliciano v. Hernandez Colon, 697 F. Supp. 37 (D.P.R. 1988); Inmates of 
Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Wecht, 699 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Jackson v. Gardner, 639 F. 
Supp. 1005 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Ramos v. Lamm, 520 F. Supp. 1059 (D. Colo. 1979). 
 194. E.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (upholding population cap order). 
 195. E.g., HAAR, supra note 31, at 221 (noting that the court in the Boston Harbor case 
threatened to enjoin sewer hookups for new residences unless effective action was taken to 
remedy pollution to the Harbor). 
 196. There are several cases approving receiverships or related remedies. Morgan v. 
McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) (imposing receivership of high school in connection 
with city-wide desegregation effort); Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008) (imposing receiver to supervise prison health care); Perez v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 
N.E.2d 1231 (1980) (imposing receivership for housing authority); Order Appointing 
Compliance Director, Allen v. City of Oakland, No. 00–cv–04599 TEH (NC) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
4, 2013), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0010-0016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SAB7-Q9GV] (imposing police department “compliance director”); 
Consent Order Appointing Transportation Administrator, Consent Order Appointing 
Transportation Administrator, Petties v. D.C., 238 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.D.C. Jun. 25, 2003) (No. 
CIV.A. 95–0148(PLF), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/ED-DC-0001-0002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CU46-4WPU] (imposing “transportation administrator” for school special 
needs program); Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Dep’t of Mental 
Retardation, 677 N.E.2d 127 (1997) (imposing receiver for residential facility for 
developmentally disabled); Wayne Cty. Jail Inmates v. Wayne Cty. Chief Exec., 444 N.W.2d 
549 (Mich. App. 1989) (imposing receiver for jail). 
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in PLL is more extensive and long-term, provisions regarding modification and 
termination of decrees are more important. 
1. Bankruptcy 
After confirmation, reorganization plans are usually implemented fairly quickly. 
Important governance changes will usually have been front-loaded into the plan, so 
that effectuating them will be something of a formality following confirmation. Asset 
sales and distributions of cash or securities under the plan will likewise usually occur 
fairly quickly after confirmation. Failures to do so will usually be interpreted as 
material defaults under the plan, which may have the practical effect of leading a 
court to conclude that the case should be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation or 
dismissed. 
For a limited time, a plan can be modified after confirmation, although 
modifications may not undermine the major procedural or substantive elements of 
the plan as it was confirmed (e.g., classification, treatment, etc.). More important, 
plans cannot be modified after “substantial consummation.”197 Substantial 
consummation focuses on whether the major transactions contemplated by the plan 
have, in fact, been completed.198 If so, then absent provisions in the plan or 
confirmation order specifically retaining jurisdiction,199 the bankruptcy court’s role 
in the restructuring is, for all practical purposes, at an end.200 
This is not, however, to say that confirmed plans always work. Rather, a small but 
important number of companies that have operated after plan confirmation and 
consummation have required another Chapter 11 restructuring, either to address 
unsatisfied obligations under the prior plan, or new problems not anticipated at the 
time the earlier plan was confirmed.201 Still, Chapter 11 reorganization plans—the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. See infra note 198.  
 198. “Substantial consummation” is defined as  
(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan to be 
transferred; (B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under 
the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the 
property dealt with by the plan; and (C) commencement of distribution under the 
plan. 
11 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
 199. Id. § 1127(a). In theory, a confirmation order can be appealed. However, U.S. Courts 
of Appeal have developed a doctrine of “equitable mootness.” This holds that an appellate 
court will not reverse a confirmation order following substantial consummation if doing so 
would upset settled expectations under the plan. In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 277–
78 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 200. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 7 F.3d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1993). So, for example, an 
objection to a plan’s feasibility is moot where the plan has been substantially consummated. 
In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 957 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 201. See A Window on the World of Big-Case Bankruptcy, supra note 21. The Bankruptcy 
Research Database “contains data on all of the more than one-thousand large public companies 
that have filed bankruptcy cases since October 1, 1979.” Id. It shows that several companies 
have gone through Chapter 11 three times: Anchor Glass Container Corporation (1996, 2002 
& 2005), Grand Union Company (1995, 1998 & 2000), Harvard Industries, Inc. (1991, 1997 
& 2002), and Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992, 1995, & 2001). The casinos owned and 
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heart of the restructuring—are confirmed fairly quickly. All told, prebankruptcy 
negotiations through substantial consummation of the plan may occur in one, and 
rarely more than two, years. This is obviously quite a bit faster than the period during 
which public agencies are typically under judicial supervision in PLL, sometimes 
running into decades. 
2. Public Law Litigation 
The standard for modification of a decree requires the objecting party to show 
changed circumstances that make continued enforcement “inequitable” or “not in the 
public interest.”202 This is uncontroversial in the abstract, but interpretation raises 
some difficult issues.  
On the one hand, it is important that the defendant not be allowed to respond to 
allegations of noncompliance by relitigating previously settled issues. On the other, 
it is also important that the agency not be locked into a set of practices that prove 
costly or dysfunctional in unanticipated ways. Commenters have been particularly 
concerned that in some settlements, officials may use decrees to immunize 
controversial policies they favor against change by subsequent administrations.203 
In Horne v. Flores, the Supreme Court reversed a district court’s refusal to modify 
a decree regarding English-as-a-second-language instruction in response to the 
defendant’s claim that it was no longer appropriate in the light of changed 
circumstances.204 The new circumstances included recent research indicating that 
methods other than those contemplated by the decree might be more effective and a 
new accountability regime required by federal statute that addressed language 
proficiency.205 The good faith of the defendant’s claims was suspect given its 
minimal efforts to comply with the decree from the outset, but the Supreme Court 
remanded with instructions to the lower court to treat the claims with more 
deference.206 The opinion clearly signals a more accommodating attitude toward 
defendant requests for modification. However, it does not explicitly change the 
requirement of “changed circumstances” making the decree “inequitable” or “not in 
the public interest” as a condition of revision. 
                                                                                                                 
 
operated by President Trump appear to hold the record for repeat filings among large corporate 
debtors, with four sets of Chapter 11 cases, in 1991–92, 2004, 2009, and 2014, respectively. 
See Jonathan C. Lipson, Making America Worse: Jobs and Money at Trump Casinos, 1997-
2010 (Temple University Beasley Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2016-47, 2016) (empirical 
study of employment and revenue patterns at Atlantic City casinos in connection with Trump 
casino bankruptcies). 
 202. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).  
 203. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009); McConnell, supra note 127; H. Peter 
Metzger & Richard A. Westfall, The Great Ecology Swindle, 15 POL’Y REV. 71 (1981) 
(describing a questionable settlement between the Community Services Administration and 
environmental activists that allocated money from a low-income energy assistance program to 
“energy advocacy” activities). 
 204. 557 U.S. at 443. 
 205. Id. at 467. 
 206. Id. at 459. 
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When the issue is termination rather than modification, the formal standard is 
“substantial compliance.”207 This is generally understood to involve both current 
compliance with substantive obligations and “sustainability”—demonstrated 
likelihood that the defendant will remain in compliance. Sustainability can be 
supported by evidence that practices of monitoring and reassessment associated with 
improvement will remain in place.208 
Decrees often have a fixed term, though they can be extended if compliance is not 
achieved by the end of the term. Some decrees contemplate termination when the 
agency has met specified outcomes. Outcomes might include installation of up-to-
date information technology or achievement of specified caseload levels for social 
workers or the reduction in waiting times following requests to see prison doctors. 
More ambitious targets are more qualitative: for example, a reduction in sustained 
use-of-force complaints against police officers or a specified percentage of children 
in placements deemed “acceptable” by some audit process. Qualitative outcome 
targets can be risky because unforeseen circumstances often affect what can 
reasonably be expected by way of outcomes. Another approach emphasizes scores 
focused on the quality of practice, an “input,” as opposed to an outcome, measure.209 
Courts are sensitive to the negative appellate and public reaction to cases 
involving decades-long judicial supervision, so they are often wary of requests for 
extension. There seems to be at least a tacit understanding that the court should 
terminate the decree when continued intervention seems likely to be fruitless even if 
substantial compliance has not been attained. 
There is some doctrinal dispute as to whether a defendant who is not in 
compliance with the decree can seek termination on the ground that the agency is 
nevertheless complying with the relevant substantive law requirements.210 In the 
absence of a showing of changed circumstances, such requests amount to a demand 
to relitigate matters the decree purported to resolve. Yet, the defendant ought to be 
heard where it says that it has discovered and implemented means to remedy the 
violations on which the decree is premised other than those specified in the decree. 
Such claims are suspect where the defendant has not made good faith efforts to 
comply with the decree, but they ought not to be categorically dismissed. 
PLL’s “substantial compliance” standard sounds like, and shares important 
characteristics with, Chapter 11’s “substantial consummation” standard. In both 
cases, the court seeks evidence that the defendant or debtor has not only developed 
an acceptable plan but also that it has largely been implemented to the satisfaction of 
most constituencies. Neither standard requires perfection, and both embed an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 207. See, e.g., R.C. v. Walley, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123–28, 1134–83 (M.D. Ala. 2007) 
(providing an exceptionally thorough and thoughtful application of the “substantial 
compliance” standard).  
 208. The Supreme Court in Horne v. Flores seems to accept the sustainability requirement 
by referring to a “durable remedy.” 557 U.S. at 450; see also Walley, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1123–
28.  
 209. Decrees in cases involving child welfare systems that emphasize an audit process 
involving qualitative measures of both practice and outcomes are described in R.C. v. Walley, 
475 F. Supp. 2d at 1160–61; Noonan et al., supra note 161, at 533. 
 210. See Mark Kelley, Note, Saving 60(b)(5): The Future of Institutional Reform 
Litigation, 125 YALE L.J. 272 (2015). 
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expectation of good faith. Both operationalize the rule-of-law values that undergird 
these spheres. While the details and timing of each differ, both signal that the parties 
have reformed and restabilized the organization, and thus the remedial effort was 
likely effective.211 
III. COMPLAINTS ABOUT PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION IN LIGHT OF THE COMPARISON TO 
BANKRUPTCY 
The foregoing shows that courts and stakeholders approach public law litigation 
and bankruptcy in similar ways: courts respond to mass default by facilitating 
negotiated improvements in governance and accountability focused on overall 
reform rather than inserting themselves into the day-to-day operations of the 
organization. Public law litigation has been more controversial than bankruptcy 
reorganization, but many objections to the former would be, if valid, applicable to 
the latter as well. The comparison to bankruptcy suggests some helpful responses to 
such objections as well as positive arguments for the role of courts in addressing 
disputes arising from institutional dysfunction, which we set forth in this Part. 
A. Objections to Public Law Litigation 
1. Courts are not authorized or equipped to administer complex organizations.212 
A basic challenge to the legitimacy of public law litigation asserts that structural 
remedies require the court to exercise “executive” powers and hence to violate the 
separation of powers. A functional variation emphasizes that judges lack the 
expertise and resources to engage in restructuring and ongoing supervision of 
organizations. 
The legitimacy challenge assumes an implausibly rigid conception of judicial 
function. Contemporary discussion overlooks the broad range of administrative 
functions American courts have played. In the nineteenth century, judges 
superintended a variety of functions now associated with administrative agencies. 
They oversaw the regulation of ship safety, the distribution of federal land, and the 
award of veterans’ pensions.213 Then, as now, they administered estates and oversaw 
business reorganizations.214 In these activities, judicial personnel were not just 
reviewing decisions by executive officers, but were often themselves making original 
decisions about compliance, eligibility, or distribution. Few contended that such 
activity was inappropriate or outside the “judicial power.”215 Today, both the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 211. Discussions about framework decrees increasingly share bankruptcy’s concerns about 
case duration, although it typically takes public agencies longer to emerge from judicial 
supervision of a consent decree than a corporation’s exit from bankruptcy.  
 212. E.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 3; SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 3; Yoo, supra 
note 3. 
 213. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 121–37, 188–204, 256–67 (2012). 
 214. Id. 
 215. The exception that proves the rule is the controversy around the statute challenged in 
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792). Three Supreme Court Justices suggested on circuit that a 
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increased volume and complexity of claims has forced judges to adopt sophisticated 
management practices even with respect to conventional private law and criminal 
cases.216 
The bankruptcy analogy provides a strong response to the concern about judicial 
expertise. In neither bankruptcy nor PLL will a court directly manage an organization 
or, in most cases, specify its operations in detail. Instead, it seeks in the first instance 
to induce the parties to negotiate the reforms needed to bring the organization into 
compliance. More often than not, all or part of a PLL decree, like a bankruptcy plan, 
will reflect broad agreement. After that point, the court’s role is to induce compliance 
with the decree and settle disputes about interpretation and modification—not to 
prescribe its terms. Where agreement is not achieved, the court may choose among 
competing proposals by the parties, usually based on expert opinion. As with the 
bankruptcy plan, the thrust of the PLL framework decree is to set out a managerial 
framework that promotes responsible and transparent decision-making going 
forward by the professionals best suited to make those decisions—management. 
After the decree is entered, the court’s role is primarily to enforce the decree, as it 
would with any order. 
2. Liability findings do not entail any particular remedy; hence, judicial authority. 
is unconstrained.217  
In both bankruptcy and public law litigation, judges may exercise authority over 
organizational matters not specifically regulated by doctrine. This has led to claims 
that judges in PLL act outside the rule of law. In fact, judges in both contexts are 
disciplined in three ways: social norms, stakeholder consensus, and performance 
measurement. 
Some dimensions of the remedy are dictated by business or professional norms. 
In cases of dispute, norms can be established by expert witnesses or consultants. In 
bankruptcy, for example, courts draw on established business norms to determine 
whether a plan is feasible.218 Comparable norms are often available in public law 
litigation. For example, in policing, norms have emerged regarding use-of-force 
reporting, civilian complaint review, and “early intervention” regarding problem 
officers.219 
                                                                                                                 
 
statute providing for pension applications to be addressed to and decided by judges violated 
Article III. Id. The putative defect, however, was not the conferring of initial decision-making 
on judges; it was the subjection of the judges’ decisions to review by executive officials. Id. 
 216. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 4, at 488–91 (emphasizing the administrative 
dimension in such private law activities as the enforcement of money judgments and family 
law decrees); Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 441–
44 (2007) (discussing instances of administrative reform within the court system of the 
criminal process); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378–80 (1982) 
(emphasizing the critical role of judicial case management in a world where most cases settle). 
 217. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 554–59 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting); SANDLER & 
SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 104–09, 123. 
 218. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 
443 (1999). 
 219. See WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 40, at 68–207. 
588 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:545 
 
In bankruptcy, the most important discipline of judicial remedial authority comes 
from the need for agreement among stakeholders and bankruptcy’s priority rules.220 
Key remedial choices under a plan are made by the parties, subject to judicial 
approval.221 In the face of serious recalcitrance either by management or creditors, a 
court will likely threaten (and perhaps impose) default penalties ranging from 
appointing a trustee to liquidating the debtor. All have the effect of depriving major 
stakeholders of the opportunity to negotiate an alternative remedy. When the plan 
process works—as it usually does in large cases—the court will have helped to 
induce fair participation by affected interests which, in turn, confers legitimacy on 
the process and advances the system’s underlying welfare-maximization norms. In 
addition, the success or failure of the plan will be visible, and failure will reflect on 
the court. Bankruptcy judges tend to be sensitive to the success or failure of large 
cases, and this sensitivity channels their conduct toward Chapter 11’s rehabilitative 
goals. 
There are analogies in PLL. A negotiated plan is not a requirement, but judges 
tend to facilitate negotiation by the parties and sometimes consultation with other 
stakeholders. For example, the remedies opinion in the New York police case asserts 
that “community input is . . . [a] vital part of . . . [the] remedy in this case.”222 
Accordingly, the order requires appointment of a facilitator to organize a “remedial 
process,” including “‘town hall’ type meetings in each of the five boroughs in order 
to provide a forum in which all stakeholders may be heard.”223 Reformers seek 
consensus because it makes compliance more likely and because it enhances the 
legitimacy of judicial intervention. 
Finally, some constraint on judicial authority arises from performance 
measurement. Bankruptcy incorporates basic accounting measures and reporting 
practices designed to make success or failure visible. Since poor financial 
performance will tangibly affect stakeholders, its prospect disciplines stakeholder 
negotiations, and since it will reflect more diffusely on the court, it probably 
constrains it as well. Courts want salvageable debtors to reorganize successfully and 
to rapidly liquidate those that are not.  
Something similar occurs in PLL. Consistent with emerging public administration 
norms, reforms typically mandate performance measurement and reporting and may 
specify metrics. Thus, success or failure should become more visible, even as the 
restructuring may permit or promote some managerial flexibility. As these measures 
                                                                                                                 
 
 220. Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking 
Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1271 (2013) (“Creditors begin by 
bargaining inside a priority framework. Existing rules reflect and implement that bargain, for 
the most part.”); see also Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 978 (2017) (“A 
distribution scheme . . . cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the 
basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final 
distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies.”). 
 221. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012).  
 222. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 686–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 223. Id. The Cincinnati police case produced a widely noted process of community 
engagement. See John E. Eck & Jay Rothman, Police-Community Conflict and Crime 
Prevention in Cincinnati, Ohio, in PUBLIC SECURITY AND POLICE REFORM IN THE AMERICAS 
225 (John Bailey & Lucía Dammert eds., 2006). 
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make the agency more accountable, they also provide evidence of whether the court’s 
intervention has been beneficial.  
3. Noncompliance is often due to budget inadequacy, and it is either undesirable or 
infeasible for courts to mandate increased appropriations.224 
We have noted that some PLL reforms do not increase expenses, and some 
increased expenses can be met with resources freed by new management practices. 
Yet, it is undeniable that many decrees depend on new resources. 
Neither in bankruptcy nor in public law litigation do courts produce resources by 
appropriating them directly. In the bankruptcy context, the parties must convince 
lenders or investors of the viability of the company and their plan in order to secure 
any necessary financing.225 Although courts have some capacity to cajole recalcitrant 
current lenders to provide more reasonable terms, they cannot force a lender to lend, 
or a debtor to borrow. Nor could courts otherwise induce outside investors to make 
new equity infusions in a debtor.  
In the public law litigation context, an unusually aggressive decree might order 
executive officials with taxing or borrowing authority to exercise that authority.226 
But courts often disclaim such authority, and even where it might be available, seem 
reluctant to exercise it.227 More often, a decree will require the defendant 
administrators to make their best efforts to seek resources from the legislature or 
private organizations. Legislatures have great capacity to resist such requests, and 
private institutions are usually free to refuse their support, as well. 
Thus, it seems likely that the success of public law litigation in inducing enhanced 
resources for reform rests, as in bankruptcy, substantially on forces other than the 
coercive power of the courts. One important factor is the persuasive force of the 
claims and the court’s order. The plaintiffs and the court will have mobilized 
stakeholders, assembled arguments and evidence, focused public attention on the 
problems, and achieved some measure of agreement on desirable reforms. The 
pressures on the legislature that arise from such activity are well within our 
established constitutional framework. 
Moreover, like bankruptcy, a public law decree may attract support from both 
public and private sources by making new investment seem more promising. Like a 
Chapter 11 plan, a PLL decree may have enhanced safeguards against waste, improve 
accountability mechanisms, and reflect a more promising operating plan. And to the 
extent the plan has the support of the parties (and perhaps other stakeholders, such 
as service providers), it gives some reassurance to the legislature that the new 
resources will settle the controversy and achieve political acceptance. It is evidence 
that those affected by the underlying system view the plan favorably. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 224. See supra note 175; see also HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 257–60; SANDLER & 
SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 91–92;  
 225. See Chrysler Sold, supra note 172. 
 226. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (holding in the context of a desegregation 
suit that the court may order the defendant school board to increase taxes).  
 227. See Perez v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. 1980) (reversing on sovereign 
immunity grounds an order requiring state officials to borrow money to fund statutorily 
required improvements in public housing).  
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4. PLL decrees ignore the polycentric nature of institutional reform. If you pull on 
one strand of the spider’s web, the pressure will radiate to others. For example, if 
you mandate strict compliance with welfare application processing deadlines, 
agencies will shift workers from case maintenance to eligibility determination at 
the expense of the former.228 
This complaint is not made in bankruptcy. The reason for its absence there is 
equally applicable to public law litigation, at least to the relatively comprehensive 
framework decrees. Courts do not intervene piecemeal. Rather, they try to intervene 
broadly, inducing enterprise-wide (or in public law litigation, agency-wide or 
program-wide) plans. 
Moreover, polycentricity is not a problem unique to structural litigation. An 
individual money judgment or a narrowly tailored injunction will also require 
resources to implement, and without new appropriations, these resources may come 
at the expense of other activities. Indeed, corporate debtors sometimes require 
bankruptcy because, as in the Texaco bankruptcy, the company has suffered an 
adverse judgment so severe as to impair its ordinary operations.229 Bankruptcy can 
be a firm-wide response to a problem that was originally bilateral in nature. 
Judges in cases seeking narrow equitable relief are sometimes told to try to take 
account of collateral effects of their orders on other agency activities.230 But it may 
be more difficult for them to do so when the liability determination implicates only 
a narrow range of the defendant’s activities. By putting broad swaths of 
interconnected activities in issue, structural relief forces attention to the relationships 
among activities and encourages explicit and systematic articulation of priorities. 
And the framework approach permits adaptation as new problems are discovered. 
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Note the paradox: if the framework rather than command-and-control approach 
to structural relief is taken, relatively comprehensive intervention is often more 
tractable than narrowly focused intervention. Judicial rhetoric emphasizing narrow 
tailoring of remedy to right is thus misguided. In bankruptcy, the right to payment 
sounds like it demands a simple remedy: payment. In individual collection, that is 
what happens. But when a large corporate debtor defaults generally, narrowly 
tailoring remedies to each creditor’s claim would be impossibly wasteful. 
Coordinating an effective remedy in both Chapter 11 and PLL may require—and 
reflect—wholesale restructuring rather than retail rights recognition in order to avoid 
problems of polycentricity. 
5. Plaintiffs and defendants often conspire to entrench preferred policy solutions 
against political revision and/or to expand agency resources.231 
In bankruptcy, managers and senior creditors are sometimes accused of 
conspiring at the expense of junior creditors. Bankruptcy structures and processes 
create a variety of checks to minimize this, including committee oversight, priority 
rules and standards, and the appointment of an examiner or trustee.232 But bankruptcy 
doctrine also recognizes that all parties have a shared interest in a successful 
reorganization, and it does not view collaboration as categorically suspect. Indeed, it 
seeks to induce collaboration, in large part because collaboration within this 
framework is likely to advance reorganization’s larger policy goals of maximizing 
wealth in the face of financial distress. As noted above, concerns arise with respect 
to stakeholder representation in bankruptcy, but courts and administrative adjuncts 
(the Office of the United States Trustee) have adapted practice to respond.233 
Concerns about management sympathy for or collaboration with plaintiffs in PLL 
are more intense. Critical discussion seems inconsistent. On one hand, doctrine often 
insists on presumptive deference to administrators, even after they have conceded 
liability or been adjudicated liable, on grounds of political legitimacy.234 On the other 
hand, when administrators agree with plaintiffs, they are suspected of acting from 
nefarious motivations, such as empire-building.235 
A few PLL decrees have been plausibly accused of policy entrenchment, and to 
the extent that it is a problem, the Supreme Court’s demand in Horne v. Flores that 
district courts take seriously claims for modification based on changed circumstances 
addresses this problem.236 However, policy entrenchment is less likely to be 
problematic in the large range of public law litigation decrees that take the framework 
approach. The framework decree emphasizes process and accountability and leaves 
the defendant broad discretion to change practices so long as it does so explicitly and 
transparently. Disputes can still be brought to a monitor appointed under the decree, 
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and ultimately the court, but the presumption with respect to such matters is in favor 
of flexibility. Such decrees are more accommodating of change than Horne v. Flores 
requires.237 Indeed, their general tendency is to induce adaptation rather than 
entrenchment. 
In general, administrative sympathy for or agreement with plaintiffs should not 
be presumptively suspect. Where managers seem inadequately motivated to oppose 
plaintiffs on specific contestable matters, that should be treated, as it is in bankruptcy, 
as a problem of representation, not as a categorical objection to structural remedies. 
Problems of representation in aggregate litigation are hardly novel, and courts in a 
variety of contexts have developed means of addressing those problems.238 
B. Positive Arguments 
Courts reform troubled organizations in both bankruptcy and PLL, our study 
suggests, because they have unique capacities to help the parties restructure them 
when other institutional choices fail. We summarize here several of the most 
important capacities common to both spheres. 
First, courts are largely independent of market and political forces. While there 
will sometimes be claims that judicial decisions are politicized in some way, no legal 
actor is likely to be less burdened by political or market pressures than courts. Thus, 
courts occupy a special place in relation to the dysfunctions that contribute to the 
conditions that often produce the need for restructuring in the first place. Courts can 
induce reforms in both bankruptcy and PLL because they are removed from the 
causes of system failure and the political and market pathologies that often prevent 
extrajudicial reform. 
Second, judges in both bankruptcy and PLL have developed special operating 
capacities to facilitate reform that give them a comparative advantage under 
conditions where more conventional reform mechanisms fail. For example, while 
judges are not experts in the substantive fields of the institutions they help to 
reform—whether police departments or airlines—they are experts in delimiting and 
resolving disputes. Thus, in both bankruptcy and PLL, judges are able to assess the 
transparency and fairness, including the adequacy of representation, of the process 
that produced the agreement. At the same time, they are likely to promote agreement 
where possible to achieve plans of reorganization or settlement agreements that 
embody large areas of consensus, so long as they appear credibly responsive to the 
underlying problem.239 Subjecting these agreements to judicial review provides an 
independent check on the propriety and feasibility of the agreed restructuring which 
enhances their persuasive and instrumental force.240 
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To the extent courts cannot induce agreement, judges retain the power both to 
coerce through adjudication and to declare the law in order to help establish norms 
that will guide future disputes. These more traditional adjudicative functions are not 
displaced by judges’ efforts to facilitate agreement, but they instead work in tandem. 
No one doubts that judges have a comparative advantage over other market and legal 
actors in using traditional litigation techniques to decide disputes in other contexts, 
and the same would appear to be true in bankruptcy and PLL. And, because judges 
are experts in dispute resolution, their warnings to parties about the costs and benefits 
of the choice between litigation and settlement are likely to have significant 
credibility.  
Third, courts may have a comparative advantage in their capacities to produce and 
manage information. Both Chapter 11 cases and the civil litigations in PLL require 
the production of significant amounts of information, much of which becomes part 
of the public record, either through the litigation process or through the plans and 
decrees that resolve these cases. The public character of this work imposes a level of 
accountability on courts and parties not likely to be found elsewhere. While the 
negotiations that lead to or implement resolution may not be public, the factual record 
upon which decisions are made will be.241 Moreover, the public record thus produced 
increases the capacity for parties in future cases to gauge their likelihood of success 
and to learn techniques for resolution that might not otherwise be apparent. Courts 
have long been understood to play an educative role generally.242 The transparency 
of their work in bankruptcy and PLL is no different.  
This is not to say that bankruptcy or PLL is perfect. Indeed, observers and 
practitioners criticize both, and we can imagine future work offering specific 
examples of developments in bankruptcy that might improve PLL practice. For 
example, early practice under the Bankruptcy Code was, as noted, challenged for the 
delay and cost associated with the Chapter 11 process. This led some to argue that 
Chapter 11 should be eliminated243—just as some today argue that we should 
eliminate PLL. Instead, however, cooler heads prevailed, and the Chapter 11 system 
adapted. A similar adjustment has been underway in PLL and is likely to continue. 
The evolution from “command-and-control” PLL decrees to “framework” decrees 
has been, in part, a response to criticism about the rigidity and duration of the earlier 
decrees, and their lack of success in producing reformed public systems. 
CONCLUSION 
Critics have for many years chastised courts supervising public law litigations 
even though that same role and functionality are the daily diet of courts supervising 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies. For these critics, the message of this Article is simple: if 
PLL is an illegitimate judicial activity, then so too is Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Since 
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no one would seriously make the latter claim, critics of PLL should more carefully 
assess the character and grounds of their opposition. 
We do not suggest that PLL or bankruptcy should be immune from criticism. The 
mere fact that courts in both contexts do substantially similar work does not mean 
that they always do it well. Indeed, we think there are likely important areas for 
improvement in both contexts, for example and in particular, the duration of PLL 
decrees, which we reserve for future work. But arguments about legitimacy merely 
distract from those more concrete projects. An implication of this Article is that 
scholarship about PLL should focus not on whether we should have it, but how to 
make it more effective. 
We thus recognize that neither PLL nor Chapter 11 are optimal solutions. As in 
so many contexts, the real choices available to parties confronting large-scale failure 
are amongst what Neil Komesar would call “imperfect alternatives.”244 No avenue 
for organizational reform—legislature, market, or court—is ideal. We have shown 
how and why courts are often a better choice for the difficult work of institutional 
reform in PLL by reference to the highly analogous work they do in bankruptcy. 
Organizational restructuring is an inevitable feature of post-bureaucratic society. 
Contrary to PLL’s critics, we have shown how and why courts do—and should 
—play a significant role in the difficult and important work of facilitating these 
reforms. 
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